Democratic Peace Theory Ii Notes

Democratic Peace Theory (II)

First… some works to definitely look at:

For Empirics: Russett (1993)

• Controls, Tests 3 historical periods

For a good Literature Synthesis: Chan’s work

Domestic Institutions (one causal logic explaining DPT)

Constraints are placed on elected leaders by domestic institutions

• Citizens will not elect leaders who want war (Kant, Doyle)

• Domestic Institutions and Ideology

Shared Norms: public trust and respect for other democracies

• Democratic culture encourages compromise (Maoz and Russet 1993)

• Social norms: democracies don’t fight each other

Empirical Tests

• Huth and Allee (2002) tested three domestic variables

1. Political accountability

2. Political norms

3. Political affinity

• Three stages: challenge status quo, negotiation, military escalation

Learning (DPT causal logic II)

Re-interpreting Kant: people learn from experience of bloodshed and destruction to demand Republican government (Cederman 2001)

States change their behaviour because of past experiences

Trade (DPT causal logic III)

Establishing of peaceful norms through trade (Kant 1795)

Democracies more likely to be econ independent (Owen 2005)

Contracts (DPT causal logic IV)

For example, see Charles Lipson, Reliable Partners (2003)

Democracies can enter into binding contracts

DPT Implications for IR Theory

A nail in the coffin (concerning realism)?

• Russett (1993) : “realism has no place for the expectation that democracies will not fight each other”

• Levy (1998) Domestic factors matter!

Criticisms of Democratic Peace Theory Logic

Reverse Logic: is it democracy that leads to peace or vice-versa?

• Thompson (1996) finds evidence for primacy of peace

Norms argument (countering the causal logic)

• We cannot distinguish between norms-based and interest-based actions (Farber and Gowa 1995)

• Mearsheimer (1990): Realism rules, not DPT

• Democracies do not trust or respect one another when interests are at stake (Rosato 2003)

Domestic Institutions (countering the causal logic)

• Domestic ‘constraining’ institutions more hawkish than their heads of state (Owen 1994)

• Voters (mass publics) may have different character to what Kant would describe

  • Consumed by nationalism and religious fundamentalism

  • Stemming from the above, member of public are more likely to support wars (Mearsheimer 1990)

• Slow mobilization: easy to circumvent the democratic process (Rosato 2003)

Markets and Trade Logic

• Friedman’s Golden Arches Theory of Conflict Prevention

  • The basic idea...

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