Consciousness And Qualia Notes

Consciousness I

‘Consciousness and Its Place in Nature’ – Chalmers

• Reductive views of consciousness are incorrect

• The hard problem of consciousness is the problem of subjective experience

• A mental state is conscious when there is something it is like to be in that state

• A solution to the hard problem would involve an account of the relation between physical processes and consciousness, explaining on the basis of natural principles how and why it is that physical processes are associated with states of experience.

• A reductive explanation would do this wholly on the basis of physical principles that don’t make any appeal to consciousness

• A materialist solution is one in which consciousness is itself seen as a physical process

• A nonmaterialist solution is a solution on which consciousness is seen as nonphysical (even if closely associated with physical processes)

• Argues against materialism

  • By the character of physical explanation, physical accounts explain only structure and function, where the relevant structures are spatiotemporal structures, and the relevant functions are causal roles in the production of a system’s behaviour

  • Zombie argument: it is conceivable therefore possible that there be a system that is physically identical to a conscious being, but that lacks at least some of that being’s conscious states

  • Knowledge argument: there are facts about consciousness that are not deducible from physical facts

  • All 3 arguments start by establishing an epistemic gap > ontological gap

• Type-A materialism: there is no epistemic gap/can be easily closed

• Type-B materialism: there is an epistemic gap but there is no ontological one

• Type-C materialism: an epistemic gap exists but is closable in principle

• Type-D dualism: microphysics is not causally closed, and phenomenal properties play a causal role in affecting the physical world

• Type-E dualism: phenomenal properties are ontologically distinct from physical properties, and the phenomenal has no effect on the physical

• Type-F monism: consciousness is constituted by the intrinsic properties of fundamental physical entities

• Also idealism, overdetermination

• Consciousness has a fundamental place in nature

‘Quining Qualia’ – Dennett

• Conscious experience has no properties that are special in any of the ways qualia have been supposed to be special

• “What counts as the way the juice tastes to x can be distinguished, one supposes, from what is a mere accompaniment, contributory cause, or by-product of this “central” way.”

• “The mistake is not in supposing that we can in practice ever or always perform this act of purification with certainty, but the more fundamental mistake of supposing that there is such a residual property to take seriously, however uncertain our actual attempts at isolation of instances might be.”

• We normally think in a confused and potentially incoherent way when we think about the way things seem to us.

‘What Is It Like to Be a Bat?’ – Nagel

• The subjective character of experience is not captured by any of the familiar reductive analyses of the mental, for all of them are logical compatible with its absence.

• Bat sonar, though clearly a form of perception, is not similar in its operation to any sense that we posses, and there is no reason to suppose that it is subjectively like anything we can experience or imagine.

• Our own experience provides the basic material for our imagination, whose range is therefore limited.

• This suggests there are facts that do not consist in the truth of propositions expressible in human language.

• If the facts of experience are accessible only from one point of view, then it is a mystery how the true character of experiences could be revealed in the physical operation of that organism.

‘Naming and Necessity’ – Kripke

• “[T]here is of course no obvious bar, at least (I say cautiously) none which should occur to any intelligent thinker on a first reflection just before bedtime, to advocacy of some identity theses while doubting or denying others.” 329

• “[A] philosopher who wishes to refute the Cartesian conclusion [that the mind is distinct from the body] must refute the Cartesian premise, and the latter task is not trivial.”

• A: a particular pain sensation.

• B: the corresponding brain state (or the brain state some identity theorist wishes to identify with A).

• “Prima facie, it would seem that it is at least logically possible that B should have existed (Jones’s brain could have been in exactly that state at the time in question) without Jones feeling any pain at all, and thus without the presence of A.”

• But the identity theorist must deny this: “If A and B were identical, the identity would have to be necessary. The difficulty can hardly be evaded by arguing that although B could not exist without A, being a pain is merely a contingent property of A, and that therefore the presence of B without pain does not imply the presence of B without A.”

• “Can any case of essence be more obvious than the fact that being a pain is a necessary property of each pain?” 329-30

• “The identity theorist who wishes to adopt the strategy in question must even argue that being a sensation is a contingent property of A, for prima facie it would seem logically possible that B could exist without any sensation with which it might plausibly be identified.” 330

• But this just seems implausible, though Kripke says a number of identity theorists argue for it.

• “A typical view is that being a pain, as a property of a physical state, is to be analyzed in terms of the ‘causal role’ of the state, in terms of the characteristic stimuli (e.g., pinpricks) which cause it and the characteristic behavior it causes.”

• The causal role of the physical state is regarded by these theorists as being a contingent property of the state, and thus it is supposed to be a contingent property of the state that it is a mental state at all, let alone something as specific as a pain.

• This amounts to the view that the very pain I now have could have existed...

Buy the full version of these notes or essay plans and more in our Philosophy of Mind Notes.