Newton Smith On Kuhn Notes

TS Kuhn: From Revolutionary to Social Democrat

1. Kuhn and the image of science

• Two lines of attack on normal image of science:

  • Weak/boring attack - there is a special method and ideal mode of application but scientific practice falls short of this

  • Strong/exciting attack - there is no such defensible ideal with which actual practice can be compared (early Kuhn)

• Is Kuhn’s use of term ‘paradigm’ too vague? Components include:

  • Shared symbolic generalizations - theoretical assumptions that are deployed without question

  • Models - agreement over particular analogies or that certain connections should be treated as identities

  • Values - theories ought to be accurate, consistent, wide in scope, simple and fruitful. Which theories are most ‘simple’ etc will be contested, intractably

  • Metaphysical principles - untestable assumptions that guide research e.g. preference for field theories over particle theories

  • Exemplars or concrete problem situations - agreement on what constitutes the nice problems of a field and what constitutes their solution. Demonstrated by textbooks. Also, consensus on what are the unsolved problems

• According to Newton-Smith, the final meaning is the ‘genesis’ of Kuhn’s understanding of paradigm, or ‘disciplinary matrix’

  • We cannot make rules specifying necessary and sufficient conditions for simple, observational predicates (e.g. is a swan) so insofar as we make such observations, we rely on exemplar cases of the instantiation of the predicate

  • Similarly in science, where shared exemplars of successful solutions are substituted for shared rules of successful solutions

• Kuhn’s use of paradigm is too broad and vague to support his assertion that the history of science is the history of clear, delineated paradigms

  • it is, however, useful in drawing attention the the importance of background beliefs, attitudes, procedures and techniques in understanding science

2. Revolutions

• Normal science includes agreement over problems and over what constitutes a solution

  • during normal science, if a test fails, the ability of the tester is questioned, not the theory

• Breakdown leads to competition between paradigms. There is no standard higher than the assent of relevant scientific communities, so propagandizing plays a key role. In fact, given that opposing paradigms are incommensurable, only propagandizing plays a role

• Kuhn assumes radical meaning variance (RMV), which holds that there is no logical contradiction between Newton’s assertion that simultaneity is not relative and Einstein’s assertion that simultaneity is relative

• RMV means that the problem of rational comparison of rival theories does not arise (what about degrees of RMV?)

• Incommensurability of paradigms would surely rely on radical variance in what constitutes a good explanation - incommensurability due to radical standard variance

  • Kuhn does not show that what constitutes a good explanation has varied in the history of science

  • e.g. shift from gravity as innate (and hence inexplicable (dubious?)) to mechanical explanation of gravity represents a change in beliefs as to what can be explained, not what constitutes a good explanation

  • Kuhn claims that the question: ‘which problems is it more significant to have solved?’ cannot be resolved non-circularly or non-paradigmatically

  • But surely the solution to problem A could be shown to lead to x, y and z paths of fruitful research, whereas B is a dead-end (isn’t this still paradigmatic?)

3. The Five Ways

• If paradigms are to be commensurable, it will be necessary that there be consistency over what constitutes a good explanation. Kuhn does describe some of the characteristics good scientific theory should have:

  • Accuracy within its domain; should be in agreement with results of existing experiments/observations

  • Consistency, internally and with other accepted theories

  • Broad scope - consequences should extend far beyond the particular observations/laws/sub theories it initially explains

  • Should be simple - bringing order to otherwise confused phenomena

  • Should be fruitful of new research findings - should disclose new phenomena

• Problem is different beliefs as to which theories are actually most simple, consistent, broad etc

• Kuhn says that these five factors can be used to persuade scientists to change their mind, but this doesn’t show one theory to be better than another

  • these factors only have force because they are generally accepted, and there is no way of justifying them

  • thus the recognised criteria doesn’t allow for justification (functional exp: is this the accepted criteria because it doesn’t allow for justification?)

• If there is no justification for these or any other principles of comparison, the project of the rationalist is doomed

  • Kuhn believes that if there could be justification for comparison, the principle of induction would be solved, and it cannot be

    • which principle of...

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