Child Meaning Notes

Bill Child - Wittgenstein

Chapter Four: From the Tractatus to Philosophical Investigations

1. From logical analysis to surveyable representation

• Tractatus - ordinary language disguises the underlying form of the thoughts it expresses

  • e.g. same words have different meanings, words that function in different ways are used as if they function in the same way - confusion

  • if we analyse propositions down to the point at which names are attached to simple objects, we will get a clear account of their meanings

    • and this will allow us to solve the problems of philosophy

• In 1929 W retained the Tractarian conception of analysis but gave up logical independence from other elementary propositions as a criterion for a proposition being an elementary proposition

• By the end of 1929 he abandoned the whole idea that the task of philosophy is to uncover the structure of thought by analysing the propositions of ordinary language into elementary propositions that are expressed in a different symbolism

  • W abandoned the idea that we need to construct a new symbolism or to invent a new language

  • he also abandoned the idea of elementary propositions as being more fundamental than, or what we mean when we say something more complex#

• Instead of searching for the root in logic of our language (geology), W say the task of philosophy as ‘seeing connections’, giving perspicuous representations of the way in which terms are used (geography/topography)

  • e.g. we have mistaken ideas about the nature of time because we suppose it can be measured in the same way as other things are measured - these disappear when we examine the differences in the use of ‘measure’

• W gave up the idea of the essence of language, instead seeing it as a family resemblance concept

  • we can understand language, games etc without knowing the necessary and sufficient conditions for something being e.g. a proposition

  • this anti-essentialism is evident in epistemology, which has moved from the examination of the necc and suff conditions of knowledge to taking knowledge as basic and unanalysable, and instead exploring the relations between knowledge and belief, evidence etc

• Opposition to W claim that just because there’s nothing in common to all propositions, doesn’t mean there isn’t something in common to all paradigmatic examples of propositions, and we can give a systematic account on this basis

2. ‘The diversity of kinds of word and sentence’: Wittgenstein’s rejection of referentialism

• In the Tractatus W claimed that a word stands for an object, that the possibility of language rested on this, and that propositions were essentially indicative

  • this is similar to (or at least an outgrowth from) Augustine’s picture of language

    • but it implies that all words function in the same way, and ‘five’, ‘red’ and ‘apples’ don’t function in the same way

      • understanding words such as ‘red’ doesn’t involve knowing objects, but knowing how they are used, including purpose, response, in what circumstances they are appropriate

    • W argues that the signifying model works perfectly well in stating the function, or role, of names, but not every word is a name

      • we can claim that all words signify objects (i.e. are names), but if we do so we will have to have a very differential account of what signification is (for different types of words) - this just pushes back the problem, so that saying ‘every word in the language signifies something’ tells us nothing whatever (PI 13)

      • alternatively we retain some content to the concept of signification, in which case not all words can signify

• How radical is this? Who would deny it?

  • orthodox view - meaning = reference of words and truth conditions of propositions

    • ‘Julia is tall’ has the meaning it does in virtue of the person referred to and the property of being tall, and these are the truth conditions

    • on this view, W just reminds us that we need a substantive account of what makes it the case that a word has a particular referent, and that many expressions don’t refer in the same way

• In fact W is claiming that a referentialist account of language is impoverished, one-sided and inaccurate

  • there is no reason to thing of words that refer as paradigmatic and others as secondary

  • there is no reason to think of indicative/descriptive propositions as primary/central - many uses of language don’t involve uttering sentences that are true or false

    • the orthodox views respond to this by claiming that the indicative form is fundamental, and questions, orders, stories jokes and riddles use indicative propositions in different forms

      • W disputes that the indicative form is fundamental - there is no reason to think it has any privileged role relative to others uses/forms

• So the orthodox view doesn’t take the diversity of language to be a barrier to a systematic account of meaning - reference is seen as fundamental

  • on W’s view, a systematic account is made impossible by this diversity: there is no one basic feature of words and no systematic account...

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