Notes on Wittgenstein's later writings on meaning, language, rules and philosophy of mind, together with extensive notes on secondary literature, including Russell, Kripke, Child, Blackburn and Baker & Hacker....
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Peter Hacker - Insight and Illusion: Themes in the Philosophy of Wittgenstein
Chapter Six: Wittgenstein’s Later Conception of Philosophy
1. A Kink in the Evolution of Philosophy
There are significant similarities in Wittgenstein’s earlier and later conceptions of philosophy, but also differences
Wittgenstein saw his method as the creation of a new subject, beyond philosophy
it was no longer a cognitive pursuit, as it has been for
Plato - philosophy concerned with eternal truths about abstract objects
Descartes - concerned with the study of the foundations of all sciences
Russell - philosophy as continuous with the natural sciences
British empiricists - investigation into the essential nature of the human mind, to clarify the extent of the possibility of human knowledge
Kant - investigation into the conditions of the possibility of experience which would yield knowledge of truths
For W, there are no philosophical propositions and no philosophical knowledge
philosophy does not aim at accumulating fresh knowledge, like science
hence it cannot be the foundation upon which science rests
the Empiricist idea that, in order to keep scepticism at bay, we must have self-certifying indubitable knowledge is a Cartesian myth
scepticism must be shown to be nonsense, rather than answered with positive theory
philosophy is concerned with the bounds of sense by not with the synthetic apriori truths that describe them (as with Kant)
Wittgenstein saw past philosophies as casting ‘norms of representation in the role of objects represented’
i.e. seeing features of the grammar of representation as essential truths about the reality we represent through language
thus past philosophies are not false, but nonsensical
Wittgenstein also rejected the idea that philosophy should construct an ideal language
in the Tractatus he claimed that the idea that natural languages were defective was absurd, and that the idea that a better/logically more perfect one could be created was ridiculous
later he refuted the idea that a concept script could represent the logical syntax of a natural language, because language is a family resemblance concept - languages don’t have one thing in common
in fact natural language are dissimilar to logical calculi
natural language is where philosophical problems arise, and creating a logical language isn’t going to solve these problems
2. A Cure for the Sickness of the Understanding
For W, the positive aim of philosophy is to order/rearrange our ideas, to establish an order in our use of language
it must give a synoptic view (of our modes of representation)
W saw grammar as analogous to geography: we can walk around a place quite comfortably (as we can use language), but find ourselves unable to map it - this is the job of philosophy
it is to be achieved through description of ordinary uses of language
we may, for instance, be perfectly comfortable in using the grammar of certain terms (e.g. sensations) but unaware of the logical differences that are covered up by uses of this same term
likewise, we might be comfortable using number-words, but unaware that some uses might suggest that numbers actually exist; are objects
thus we fail to see the difference between the use of names and the use of number-words
Negatively, it must eliminate the misunderstandings that give rise to philosophical perplexity
this means philosophy has a therapeutic role
like psychoanalysis, philosophy must take latent nonsense (theories of idealism, realism, solipsism) and render them patent nonsense
thus the philosopher must draw out what already exists (application of grammar)
there should be no disagreement in philosophy; where there is disagreement, something has not been expressed clearly
philosophy must identify the confusion/entanglement of rues that has led to crisis/contradiction (e.g. in mathematics), not resolve it through (mathematical) discoveries
3. Philosophy, Science, and Description
Philosophy is essentially descriptive; unlike the natural sciences, it contains no deductions
the only correct method in philosophy is to say nothing but what can be said - empirical, non-philosophical propositions
whenever anyone tries to say anything metaphysical, we must show them that they have failed to give a meaning to certain signs in their propositions
science constructs theories that enable prediction and explanation, involve idealization and are testable in experience
they may approximate more or less closely to the truth
these theories can constitute discoveries, and add to human knowledge
science cannot in principle solve philosophical problems because science either presupposes the very concepts at stake, or employs different concepts, bypassing the problem (and often generating further conceptual confusion)
changes in scientific paradigms do give philosophers new problems that call for a surview, however
whereas science is stratified, philosophy is flat; there is no hierarchy of explanation, because it is simply description
but maybe it does explain, in revealing conceptual connections that were not previously articulated ‘in a perspicuous surview’
there is no progress in philosophy
we are still trying to solve the same problems as the Greeks because we have the same model of language, with the verb ‘be’ alongside ‘eat’ and ‘drink’, and adjectives ‘identical’, ‘true’, ‘false’, ‘possible’
these words, with confusing/similar grammar, cause intractable, nonsensical philosophical ‘conundrums’
although philosophy concerns itself with linguistic use, it is not empirical - its problems are the conceptual problems of philosophy, not the empirical problems of linguistics
there are no real empirical solutions, nothing new, merely grammatical truisms
4. Philosophy and Ordinary Language
In the Tractatus W claims...
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Notes on Wittgenstein's later writings on meaning, language, rules and philosophy of mind, together with extensive notes on secondary literature, including Russell, Kripke, Child, Blackburn and Baker & Hacker....
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