Sep Private Language Notes

Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy - Private Language

1. Overview: Wittgenstein’s Argument and its Interpretations

• 243-315 is not just a critique of private language but also a discussion of privacy, identity, inner/outer relations, sensations as objects, sensations as justification for sensation talk

  • but the conclusion of 244-271 is ‘that a language in principle unintelligible to anyone but its originating user is impossible’ - it would be unintelligible to its user as well

1.1 Recent Developments and Their Consequences

• The attempt to interpret the Tractatus and the Philosophical Investigations together has led to two groups of interpretation

  • the orthodox/substantial/non-Pyrrhonian school see Wittgenstein as critiquing the method of other philosophers, and also presenting a positive model for how philosophy should be done

  • the resolute/Pyrrhonian school see Wittgenstein as presenting no positive theories, but rather showing traditional philosophical theorizing to be nonsensical

1.2 Are Claims Affirming the Possibility of a Private Language False or Nonsense?

• One interpretation of the private language argument holds that its form is reductio ad absurdum - that it assumes the premises of a private language before showing this assumption to lead to absurdity/contradiction

  • on this interpretation the possibility of a private language is false

    • but on another interpretation (more likely a resolute reading) W shows the possibility to be nonsensical, even as a consequence of a reductio argument

    • the resolute reading rejects the idea that there is something determinate that we cannot do; rather, the idea is simply nonsense

2. The Significance of the Issue

• The argument shows that not only actual language, but the very possibility of language depends on the possibility of agreement in human behaviour

• The argument opposes the idea that there are metaphysical absolutes which are within our reach e.g. numbers

  • they are not self-identifying objects that force their use upon us

  • there is the same temptation with sensations: we feel a sensation, we call it an ‘itch’, and then the rules for application of the word ‘itch’ are governed by the sensation itself

    • this implies that the possibility of a shared practice is irrelevant to the concept of itching; the nature of itching would be revealed in a single mental act of naming it

      • this is Russell’s view, and Wittgenstein is beefing it

• W is also beefing the philosophical orthodoxy that sees language as a matter of translating internal mental vocabulary into social vocabulary every time we speak

  • Descartes thought he could talk about his own sensory experiences whilst knowing nothing of the external world

  • we feel we can infallibly avoid error when describing ‘internal’ experiences

    • these problems all rely on sharability being irrelevant to meaning

3. The Private Language Argument Expounded

3.1 Preliminaries

• On a substantial reading, W begins by clarifying what notion of a private language is to be examined - one which is necessarily private and refers to one’s immediate private sensations

  • W then argues that this idea is incoherent or nonsensical because it violates grammar - so W relies on a substantive view of meaning

    • (is there any view of meaning that isn’t substantive? what is the difference between this and a resolute reading? shouldn’t a substantial reading show the idea to be false, rather than nonsensical?)

• On a resolute reading, W asks whether the question ‘can we imagine a private language that refers to only what the speaker can know?’ can have any sense to begin with

  • (isn’t this just the same as the substantial reading? we have to state what a private language would be in order for there to be a question at all, so what’s the difference between saying that it doesn’t make sense to ask the question and that the idea of a private language is false because it violates grammar?)

• The sensations a private language is supposed to refer to are not ordinary sensations, but the sensations of a being with no publicly available mental life (e.g. Cartesian soul)

  • W claims that we cannot come to the idea of a private language via natural language, because in natural languages sensations are expressed

  • neither can we come to the idea by subtracting expression of sensations from natural language

    • this is because a name cannot be attached simply through mental association - naming a sensation requires a place to be available in a framework; a notion of sensation

      • with no such framework, the questions are:...

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