R (Lord Carlile) v Home Secretary [2014] UKSC 60

The Human Rights Act subject’s decisions involving interference with Convention rights to independent judicial review. Courts must assess whether convincing reasons justify such interferences.

Article 10 of the ECHR guarantees the right to freedom of expression, including the right to receive and impart information and ideas.

• The court emphasizes the critical importance of this right, especially in a democratic society where Parliament's role in facilitating discussions is significant.

Lord Pannick QC and Harry Adamson (“Appellants”) include a cross-party group of prominent politicians and parliamentarians.

James Eadie QC (“Respondents”) is the Home Secretary of the United Kingdom.

The case centres on the Home Secretary's decision to exclude Mrs. Maryam Rajavi from entering the UK.

• Mrs. Rajavi is a prominent Iranian political figure and leader of the National Council of Resistance of Iran (NCRI).

• The Home Secretary’s decision was based on concerns that Mrs Rajavi’s entry into the UK could provoke a hostile reaction from the Iranian government.

• This could potentially lead to retaliatory actions against Iranian employees and UK citizens, as well as affect UK-Iran relations.

The Appellants argue that Mrs Rajavi's exclusion infringes on their right to freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights.

• They assert that allowing Mrs Rajavi into the UK is important for political debate and free speech.

• The Home Secretary provided general concerns about potential adverse reactions from Iran but did not provide specific evidence linking Mrs Rajavi’s entry to concrete risks.

• The Secretary of State's statements were criticized for being too general and not sufficiently detailed to justify the interference with Article 10 rights.

The case was brought to judicial review to determine whether the Home Secretary’s decision was justified under the Human Rights Act, which subjects decisions affecting Convention rights to independent review by the courts.

The court clarified that the review of the Home Secretary’s decision was not about whether the Secretary of State's view was tenable but whether it was right by the standards set by the Human Rights Act.

• The court's role was to assess if the interference with Convention rights was justified.

The judgment emphasized that the Human Rights Act mandated that decisions involving interference with Convention rights, including those made by the executive, were subject to independent judicial review.

• While the government could request respect for its reasons, it could not insist that the court accept its view on the importance of the right in question.

The court recognized the fundamental importance of freedom of expression under Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. It highlighted that restrictions on political speech and public interest debate were subject to strict scrutiny.

The court found the Home Secretary's concerns about potential Iranian retaliation to be general and insufficiently specific. It noted that many of the feared consequences were already occurring or were unpredictable, thus not providing a strong enough basis for the exclusion.

The judgment stressed that the balance between the potential risks of allowing Mrs. Rajavi into the UK and the significant impact on freedom of expression had to be carefully considered. The court found that the risks, as described, were not sufficiently compelling to justify the severe restriction on the appellants' rights.

The court concluded that the decision to exclude Mrs. Rajavi was not justified and quashed it.

It then allowed the appeal, determining that the interference with the appellants' Article 10 rights was not proportionate or necessary.

The case presents an examination of the balance between national security and fundamental human rights under the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR).

The judgment offers significant insights into the application of judicial review principles concerning executive decisions that impact Convention rights, particularly freedom of expression.

• A notable aspect of the judgment was the court’s critique of the Home Secretary’s risk assessment.

• The judgment found the risks of Iranian retaliation to be generalized and speculative.

• This aspect of the judgment shows the necessity for government decisions to be based on concrete and specific evidence rather than generalized fears.

• The court’s insistence on clear and compelling evidence for any significant interference with fundamental rights reflects a robust approach to safeguarding constitutional freedoms.

The court’s analysis of the balance between the potential risks of allowing Mrs Rajavi into the UK and the infringement on freedom of expression highlights the complex nature of proportionality assessments.

• By quashing the decision, the court demonstrated that speculative or broad concerns cannot easily override the weight of democratic values and rights.

• This balance is necessary for maintaining the integrity of fundamental rights in the face of potential security threats.

The judgment sets an important precedent for how courts should approach cases involving the restriction of Convention rights due to national security concerns.

It reinforces the principle that while the executive has significant expertise in matters of security, the judiciary has a fundamental role in ensuring that any restrictions on rights are justified, proportionate, and supported by specific evidence.