R v Pace and Rogers [2014] EWCA Crim 186; [2014] 1 WLR 2867

Concealing, disguising, or converting criminal property involves making illegal property appear legitimate. Under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, it is illegal to handle or deal with property known or suspected to be from criminal activities.

Prosecution typically must prove that the defendant knew or believed the property was criminal. This ensures individuals are only held liable if they were aware or suspected the property was obtained unlawfully.

Suspicion alone is usually not enough to convict a person under the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. Evidence must show that the defendant knew or suspected the property was criminally obtained.

Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 makes it a crime to take significant steps towards committing an offence, even if the crime was not completed. It focuses on the intent and actions taken toward committing the crime.

Section 327(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002 criminalizes concealing, disguising, or converting property known or suspected to be obtained through crime. It targets efforts to make illicit property appear legitimate.

Martin Edward Pace and Simonm Peter Rogers (“Defendants”) were charged with attempting to conceal, disguise, or convert criminal property under Section 1 of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981.

The substantive offence related to Section 327(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002. 

The prosecution argued that the defendants, who operated a scrap metal yard, had purchased items from undercover police officers with a suspicion that they were stolen.

• Despite this suspicion, it was established during the trial that none of the items were actually stolen. 

The trial judge dismissed the defendants' plea of no case for answering, ruling that suspicion about the criminal nature of the property could suffice for establishing the mens rea required for the offence.

The judge directed the jury based on this interpretation, leading to the Defendants' subsequent conviction.

The appeals were allowed on the grounds that intent to commit an offence under Section 1(1) of the Criminal Attempts Act 1981 required an intent to complete all elements of the offence. 

In the case of concealing, disguising, or converting criminal property, as outlined in Section 327(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002, a key element was that the property in question had to be classified as criminal property.

• Therefore, for an attempt to commit this offence, the defendant had to have intended for the property to be criminal property. 

• It was not sufficient to show merely that the defendant suspected the property was criminal; the prosecution needed to establish that the defendant knew or believed it to be so. 

The trial judge’s instructions to the jury, which allowed a conviction based on suspicion alone, were deemed incorrect.

Consequently, the defendants' convictions were considered unsafe and were quashed.

The Court of Appeal’s decision provides significant clarity on the mental state required for a conviction under the Criminal Attempts Act 1981, particularly in the context of attempted money laundering.

• This judgment is important in defining the boundaries between suspicion and a higher degree of mens rea, such as intention or knowledge, in attempt cases.

The judgment has substantial implications for both prosecution and defence strategies.

• For prosecutors, the decision means that establishing a charge of attempted money laundering requires more than demonstrating that a defendant harboured mere suspicion about the nature of the property.

• Instead, prosecutors must prove a higher mental state—such as intention or knowledge—that the property was criminally derived.

• This raises the bar for proving attempts, particularly in complex financial crimes like money laundering.

• Prosecutors will need to gather evidence that directly demonstrates the defendant’s intention or awareness rather than relying on circumstantial evidence or inferences of suspicion.

For Defendants, the ruling underscores the importance of challenging the adequacy of the prosecution’s evidence regarding mens rea.

• If a case hinges on suspicion alone, the defence can argue that this does not meet the required legal standard for an attempt.

• This can be a critical strategy in undermining the prosecution’s case and potentially securing a favourable outcome.

This landmark case in criminal law provides crucial guidance on the mental state required for attempts.

• By affirming that suspicion alone is insufficient for a conviction, the Court has clarified the legal threshold for proving an attempt, aligning it with the requirements for substantive offences.

• This decision enhances the precision of criminal prosecutions and protects the rights of Defendants, reinforcing the principle that criminal liability should be based on clear, demonstrable intent or knowledge.