V wanted to make a donation to X. He was the beneficiary of a trust fund of many shares in company 1. To minimise tax he orally instructed the trustees to transfer legal and beneficial ownership to X, but he incorporated company 2 (a trust company with his children as beneficiaries) which would have an option to buy back the shares at a low cost, with the intention that X, a charity, would simply get money from dividends. HL held that the option was held by company 2 on resulting trust for V, so that he could still be considered to have an interest in the shares and thus had greater tax liability.
Lord Reid: The theoretical basis for resulting trust comes from the need to fill the beneficial vacuum that would result if the beneficial interest wasn’t held by anybody. ``The beneficial interest must belong to or be held for somebody; so if it was not to belong to the donee or be held in trust by him for somebody, it must remain with the donor.'' This cannot explain those cases where there is no beneficial vacuum. If, for example, person A advances money to person B in order for person B to purchase land, then a court may hold that B holds that land on resulting trust for A. But it is not clear that there is any `beneficial vacuum' here. NB no mention of unjust enrichment as theoretical basis for either resulting or constructive trust