X owned two plots of land, plot A have a quasi right of way through plot B, though it had another equally good entrance that didn’t go through plot B. P, who bought pot A sued for an injunction against D, who bought plot B, for blocking up the right of access. CA held that there would be no injunction since the right of way wasn’t necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the land, as there was another right of access.
You will gather that the rule in Wheeldon v Burrows has requirements of (i) “continuous
and apparent” and/or (ii) “necessary for the reasonable enjoyment of the land granted”. Be careful not to overlook a further requirement, which comes before either of these: before the conveyance of the dominant land, splitting it from the servient, there must have been a (relevant) quasi-easement over the servient land for the benefit of the dominant. NB
The requirement of ‘necessity’ is less strict than for easements implied by necessity (obviously, or people would just use the latter) E.g. secondary rights of access (rejected in implied by necessity easements) are allowed here. A claim involving rights to use access through a drive at the front of the house, even when accessible from the back has succeeded (Borman v Griffiths).
The ‘continuous and apparent’ requirement is satisfied if the right is continually in use and obvious in nature e.g. a right to light (Swansborough v Coventry); OR although used intermittently, there is some feature on the land that indicates a right e.g. a visible road even if not constantly in use (Maugham J in Borman v Griffiths).