BCL Law Notes Constitutional Theory Notes
A collection of the best BCL notes the director of Oxbridge Notes (an Oxford law graduate) could find after combing through applications from outstanding students with the highest results in England and carefully evaluating each on accuracy, formatting, logical structure, spelling/grammar, conciseness and "wow-factor". In short, these are what we believe to be the strongest set of BCL notes available in the UK this year. This collection of notes is fully updated for recent exams, also making them...
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9. Sovereignty
HLA Hart, Concept of Law, 2nd ed. (OUP, 1994), chap. IV: ‘Sovereign and Subject’ [Google books; Keble]
Sovereign is office that
has authority by virtue of generally accepted (constitutional) rule (>habit of being obeyed) and
has no legal limit (cf legal disability, factual limit) on authority (>does not obey any other body)
In modern parliamentary context, rejects Austin’s view that electorate is sovereign
Sovereign = entity whose orders society habitually obeys & who does not obey any other entity
Critical unifying concept of a society governed by law
Two aspects of sovereignty
Habit of obedience (of subject) – accounts for continuity of obedience & persistence of laws after sovereign & subjects have passed
Superior position of sovereign – query significance
1. Habit of obedience
Obedience
Causation issue – most laws prohibit conduct that people would not engage in in any event – is an actor obedient to sovereign if complying with orders of own free will?
Definition of obedience – suggests deference to authority as well as compliance with coercive orders
Habit –
Unreflective, effortless & engrained – where no real incentive to disobey – eg driving on a certain side of the road
Mere pattern of regular behaviour – even if not natural or attractive – eg annual payment of taxes
Collective habits – behaviour of population converging on same unreflective & effortless / regular pattern of behaviour
Continuity – obedience to office rather than to person
Historical examples of obedience to king but not to son
Supervening rules required – eg succession to throne or governing election of successive parliaments – before orders can be regarded as legitimate law
EG son of king issues first order; dies immediately – is the order law even before it is obeyed?
Habit of obedience insufficient to guarantee continuity
Cannot give successor legislator any particular right
Cannot render probable habitual obedience by subjects to successor
Social/legal rules (<> habits)
Deviation attracts criticism & threatened pressure to conform
Prevailing standard viewed (by most compliant and non-compliant actors) as justifying that criticism
‘Internal’ aspect of rules – generality of behaviour is concerted rather than coincidental
Rules (<>habits) have normative aspect – perceived obligation to act in a certain way, either because
it is inherently good (eg not stealing) or
convergence of behaviour is good (eg moving chess pieces in a certain way, driving on left) or
a combination of the two (eg paying taxes) or
viewed in one way by some and in the other by others (eg taking off hat in church)
Normative ‘internal’ aspect of rules gives added force to sovereign power = acceptance of rules as well as authority to make rules = gives legitimacy
Legitimacy of sovereign power in turn permits the existence of rules governing succession
In complex democratic society
Cannot speak of citizens ‘accepting’ supervening rules of succession in the same way – they most likely don’t know of or understand them
Officials (legislative, judicial, executive) know & accept rules – citizens accept official capacity
Persistence of Law
Inverse of continuity problem –
Inherited authority of sovereign office <> Lasting authority of sovereign’s law
Successor to office already has authority before obeyed <> Predecessor to office still has authority after reign finished
Why law already? <> Why law still?
Rests on same justification – supervening rules of succession create sovereignty in office rather than in person – rules created by person in office endure
CF Hobbes (and Bentham and Austin) justifies based on obedience to sovereign legislator alone
Justification – current sovereign’s (tacit) authority is basis for obedience to previous sovereign’s rule
NB without supervening rule, ‘authority’ has no meaningful content – simply equates to ‘power’
BUT potentially has the consequence that an old statute is not ‘law’ until enforced by the current administration?
Depends on scope of ‘tacit’ – and makes little sense to talk of courts (composed of tenured members enduring past particular sovereign parliament) in this way
Also theory suggests that repeal of a law by a previous sovereign doesn’t prevent current sovereign from enforcing it? – tends towards Legal Realism (no statute is law until enforced by Court)
2. Freedom of Sovereign from obedience (no legal limits)
IE if was obedient to another legislator, would not be sovereign
Theory goes that every society with law has sovereign of this nature
Not completely true since Magna Carta
Limits to legislative power
No legal limits
Factual<>legal limit on power (eg by public opinion, due to moral conviction or fear of revolt)
Manner & form limits – but self-imposed & do not limit substantive powers as no obstruction (in law) to compliance
Legal limits – eg proscription of deprivation of liberty without trial
“Cannot” in impossibility rather than normative sense – law passed contrary to constitutional norm is no law at all <> should not pass such laws which will not be enforced if he does – legal disability <> legal duty
Therefore constitutional limits do not impose ‘duty’ of obedience on sovereign – simply limits capabilities
Rather, equate to disabilities contained in rules qualifying sovereign to legislate (same rules that give authority to successor, etc)
IE more accurate to say that no entity has superior authority over sovereign
May be limits (factual, manner & form, legal) on power
BUT ignores the fact that limits on power are subject to interpretation by courts? Legal ‘disability’ is a simplistic characterisation
May habitually obey someone’s laws, but not required to do so
– mirrors ‘authority’ of rule preferred to ‘habitual obedience’ above
Modern parliamentary context
Sovereignty can be traced to body with...
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A collection of the best BCL notes the director of Oxbridge Notes (an Oxford law graduate) could find after combing through applications from outstanding students with the highest results in England and carefully evaluating each on accuracy, formatting, logical structure, spelling/grammar, conciseness and "wow-factor". In short, these are what we believe to be the strongest set of BCL notes available in the UK this year. This collection of notes is fully updated for recent exams, also making them...
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