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BCL Law Notes Criminal Justice, Security, & Human Rights Notes

Prisoners' Rights Notes

Updated Prisoners' Rights Notes

Criminal Justice, Security, & Human Rights Notes

Criminal Justice, Security, & Human Rights

Approximately 440 pages

A collection of the best BCL notes the director of Oxbridge Notes (an Oxford law graduate) could find after combing through applications from outstanding students with the highest results in England and carefully evaluating each on accuracy, formatting, logical structure, spelling/grammar, conciseness and "wow-factor". In short, these are what we believe to be the strongest set of BCL notes available in the UK this year. This collection of notes is fully updated for recent exams, also making them...

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6: PRISONER’S RIGHTS

(i) THE KEY DISTINCTION – PERSONAL LIBERTY V RESIDUAL LIBERTY

Lazarus: conception of liberty deprivation
Summary: article concerns the legal status of a prisoner in the UK and argues that applying human rights, legality and proportionality principles, the legal status of a prisoner needs to rest on a DIVISIBLE conception of liberty which clearly articulates the KEY DISTINCTION; it is important that any conception of a prisoner’s legal status clearly distinguishes between the liberty lost/rights restricted as a consequence of the sentence being imposed as opposed to the rights restricted as a result of the administration of prison; for this to be achieved, the PURPOSE of a custodial sanction needs to be distinguished from the PURPOSE of prison administration; this article makes a comparison with Germany in order to demonstrate that the conception of the prisoner’s legal status in the UK is currently UNSTABLE as it often fails to recognise that liberty is divisible and there is no recognition of the purpose behind the administration of prison, causing the legal status of English prisoner’s to lack a foundation which is firm enough to satisfy the principles of human rights, legality and proportionality

Introduction:

  • In the liberal tradition, liberty is considered a prima facie good and liberty deprivation is considered a prima facie wrong, requiring moral justification

  • The quest to define liberty and it’s deprivation is fraught and there is also disagreement within punishment theory about the moral/political rationales for the imposition of sanctions, the punitive rationale for incarceration and its administrative objective (eg. Should the purpose of incarceration be to incapacitate or should it serve another positive purpose such as rehabilitation?)

  • Courts are at the coalface of these disagreements and without clear legislative guidance on the purpose of criminal punishment or prison administration courts are forced to confront these questions on which few people agree and many avoid

  • After the HRA came into force, the role of the courts became even more central and at present the judicial conception of the prisoner’s legal status in the UK remains under-developed, particularly in comparison to Germany where the prisoner’s legal status is firmly articulated within a highly articulated rights culture

A road map for determining the legal status of a prisoner

  • Lazarus presents a modest framework for determining what the conception of a prisoner’s legal status should address on the basis of three principles:

  1. The human rights principle

  2. The principle of legality

  3. Proportionality

  • The human rights principle establishes a presumption that the branches of government will respect human rights, with the onus of justifying infringements in the language of legality and proportionality

  • To satisfy the HR’s principle, a conception of a prisoner’s legal status must make explicit the line between the limitation of the offender’s personal liberty and human rights consequent upon the imposition of the custodial sanction and the limitation on the offender’s residual liberty and human rights, occurring as a consequence of the administration of prisons it is important to determine what is contained in the custodial sanction as a sentence as distinct from what is entailed in the administration of that sentence

  • We would only be able to dispense with the need to make the key distinction if we were to accept the view that the offender’s liberty was indivisible and accept that liberty is removed in its entirely along with other human rights when the sentence is handed down

  • BUT this view of the indivisibility of liberty and the forfeiture of HR’s has been rejected and instead it is accepted that offenders retain residual liberty and their human rights post-sentence and this is why it is important to distinguish between the liberty and rights lost in the two contexts

  • This key distinction is also a requirement of the legality and proportionality principles as justifying limitations of rights relative to the purpose of prison administration will be different from justifying rights infringements as a consequence of imposing the sentence

  • Guidance as to the purpose/rationale of both the penal sanction and the purpose of prison administration is required; if this is not done, how are we to know whether a particular rights infringement is proportionate to the purpose, if we don’t know what the purpose is? determining the purpose will determine the extent of human rights protections for the prisoner (eg. Whether it is punishment or rehabilitation will affect whether an infringement is justified) BUT this purpose needs to be applied in a stable and consistent manner MAINTAINED IN LAW

Germany: divisible and dual conceptions of liberty deprivation

  • As a consequence of the strength of German constitutionalism and its codified legal culture, the German conception of the legal status of the prisoner is highly theorised and articulated clearly

  • It is made up of 3 basic elements:

  • It rests on a strict notion of divisible liberty

  • Dual conception of prisoner’s legal status the prisoner bears negative rights against state infringement as well as positive rights to state action

  • The resocialisation purpose of imprisonment is constitutionally defined as a consequence of the positive rights of the prisoner and this frames the limitation of the prisoner’s negative rights within the prison context

  • Division is between status liberty/rights and administrative liberty/rights

  • Criminal law:

  • Prison law in Germany is conceived of as part of the criminal law reflecting the three pillar theory that criminal law consists in three stages: the material criminal law which threatens punishment, the criminal sentence which imposes punishment and the execution/administration of punishment and that there is a different purpose of punishment which predominates each stage of the criminal law (deterrence;...

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