Design Progression V. Thurloe Properties Notes
This is a sample of our (approximately) 3 page long Design Progression V. Thurloe Properties notes, which we sell as part of the Commercial Remedies BCL Notes collection, a Distinction package written at Oxford in 2013 that contains (approximately) 523 pages of notes across 153 different documents.
The original file is a 'Word (Docx)' whilst this sample is a 'PDF' representation of said file. This means that the formatting here may have errors. The original document you'll receive on purchase should have more polished formatting.
Design Progression V. Thurloe Properties Revision
The following is a plain text extract of the PDF sample above, taken from our Commercial Remedies BCL Notes. This text version has had its formatting removed so pay attention to its contents alone rather than its presentation. The version you download will have its original formatting intact and so will be much prettier to look at.
DESIGN PROGRESSION V. THURLOE PROPERTIES FACTS The lease was in respect of the ground floor shop premises at 143145 Fulham Road, London SW3. This is part of a block of premises, and the adjoining property at Pond Place, where the freehold is owned by the defendant and an associated company. The defendant apparently acquired the freehold subject to existing leases in early
2000. Little is known about the defendant. It chose to adduce no evidence in relation to what decisions it actually made. It is a company registered in the British Virgin Islands and apparently operates by virtue of a power of attorney dated 14 April 2000 granted by it to Robert Keith Corkill, an attorney in the Isle of Man. It is accepted by all parties that by 2002, when the licence to assign the subject matter of the present dispute was sought, the premises were significantly under-rented in that an open market rental of the premises on a lease granted at that time would command a rent of between £139,000 and £155,000 per annum, as summarised in a note of a Mr Lillie, a partner in Matthews &
Goodman, the defendant's managing agents, dated 29 January
2002. It is to be noted that Matthews & Goodman became aware of the proposed disposal of the premises and sought sales particulars. This was of course before any approach was made to the defendant for licence to assign. Mr Adams, of Matthews & Goodman, sent an e-mail to Mr De Lerios on 6 December 2001 referring to the claimant's lease. It is plain that these are clear instances of evidence which shows bad faith on the part of the defendant and a motivation extraneous to their duties to consider the application for licence to assign. It did not want Ms Hoppen because of the nature of her operation, allegedly. Alternatively, it wanted Ms Hoppen at a higher rental. Statutory Provisions: First, by section 1(3) of the 1988 Act, where a landlord is served with a written application by the tenant for consent to a transaction, he owes a duty within a reasonable time (a) to give consent, except ... where it is reasonable not to give consent, (b) to serve on the tenant written notice of his decision whether or not to give consent specifying in addition-(i) if the consent is given subject to conditions, the conditions, (ii) if the consent is withheld, the reasons for withholding it. Second, section 4 of the 1988 Act provides: "A claim that a person has broken any duty under this Act may be made the
****************************End Of Sample*****************************
Buy the full version of these notes or essay plans and more in our Commercial Remedies BCL Notes.