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1. Relates to 3 aspects a. Conduct b. Circumstances c. Consequences
1. Intent a. For direct intent,
i. Courts avoid giving specific direction unless necessary - usually leaves 'intent' as it is for the jury
ii. Law Commission - acting in order to bring something about a. For indirect/oblique intent, 4 steps (Woollin direction) -
i. Is this a rare case, where simple direction for intent is not enough?
ii. If so, jury is entitled (not obliged) to find intention ifiii. Result was actually a virtual certainty, barring unforeseen intervention
1. Interpreted to mean the act's "inevitable consequence" in Matthews - but cannot mean absolutely inevitable, since if D pushes V off the top of a cliff, it is conceivable that despite the fall V will not suffer death or serious injury.
Hence, virtual certainty means as certain as we can be about anything iv. D appreciated (iii) - subjective
2. Recklessness a. R v G as authority - D must i. Foresee a risk (subjective)
1. Everyone and anyone must foresee a risk, at least fleetingly, if they are held to be reckless ii. Take it iii. The risk, in the circumstances known to D, is an objectively unreasonable one to take b. Further -
i. R v G - D cannot close his mind to the obvious - in deliberately closing his mind, it is presumed that D
has foreseen the risk - and that is the end of the matter
1. In Parker, where D slammed down the handle of the telephone hard on to the machine, no defence to say he did not foresee the risk.
ii. 2 ways of reading it -
1. Brief/fleeting glimpse of the risk - satisfies the advertent test
2. Legal fiction - employing a legal fiction to achieve what is morally appropriate for this kind of case. D didn't actually foresee risk, but court tried to make it seem as though he did
3. Presumption of MR
a. Sweet v Parsley established in statutory interpretation there should be presumption of MR
4. Mistake a. A genuine belief in consent will provide a defence of consent, regardless of whether it is reasonable (Morgan)
Contemporaneity + continuing act/one transaction/creation of danger -
1. Contemporaneity rule a. Requirement i. AR & MR must coincide for a crime to be committed
(Fagan, Thabo Meli)
b. Innocent agent i. Jakeman - *MR existed at the start of the journey,
together with D's AR, despite it being ultimately completed by an innocent agent. Contemporaneity rule satisfied
1. D was importing two suitcases of cannabis from
Ghana. She left the suitcases at Paris and the
French authorities assumed it had been misrouted and forwarded it to England. She claimed to have repented during the flight and did not claim the suitcase
2. Continuing act a. Fagan - where initial act was unintentional, but when D
knew the wheel was on the officer's foot, and refused to move, contemporaneity rule is satisfied. 4 factors - when
F knew the wheel was on officer's foot, F -
i. Remained seated in the car so that his body was in indirect contact with officer through the medium of the car ii. Switched off the ignition of the car iii. Maintained the wheel of the car on the foot iv. Used words indicating the intention of keeping the wheel in that position
3. One transaction a. Thabo Meli i. Established doctrine of "one transaction", where a serious of acts constituting an overarching plan to kill cannot be divided, and AR + MR
coincidence is found through the whole transaction b. Le Brun i. Where the unlawful application of force and the eventual act causing death are parts of the same sequence of events, the same transaction, the interval of time between the two does not serve to exonerate D
ii. **Crucial that D dragged V to hide his crime
1. Requirement a. D liable for omission only if D has a duty to act
2. Act/Omission distinction a. Speck - child innocently placed her hand on a man's genital area and he did not move her hand - held to be an act by the man b. Bland - discontinuing life-sustaining treatment and medical support by doctors regarded as an omission i. Analysis by Herring - 2 strands of arguments 1. Suggestion that by switching off life support
Bland's doctors are returning him to the position he was in when arriving at the hospital
- argument is that if the doctors had left him alone and he had died, that would have been an omission - suggests that focus of the distinction is not so much physical movement, but whether there was an interruption in "nature taking its course".
a. But this might put too much weight on it.
Applying it to Speck, maybe the "natural"
course of events would be the man moving his hand away - it is unclear
2. Best to imagine life support machine as a team of doctors and nurses working to keep patient alive. If the head doctor declares it hopeless, and the team steps back, it would have been clearly an omission
3. Duties a. Statutory duty b. Duties of law enforcement c. Contractual duty -
i. Pittwood - D employed as a gatekeeper on railway line - one day failed to perform his duties and did not close the gate, leading to an accident that resulted in the death of a man. Held liable for manslaughter d. Voluntary assumption of duty - may be expressed or implied i. Stone & Dobinson - where Ds voluntarily let V stay at their house, and Dobinson took care of V, there is a duty
1. *Familial relation itself seems insufficient e. Creation of danger i. Miller - where D has created a danger, and fails to take measures that lie within one's power to counteract it, criminal liability is incurred ii. Evans - extended Miller principle - D liable if s/he contributed to creation of risk
Transferred malice 1. Rule a. When, having MR to harm V1, D inadvertently causes a
V2 to be hurt instead, D is still responsible (Latimer)
2. Complications a. Horder - that if outcome arose in an unexpected and unforeseen way, transferred malice doesn't work b. S&S - if the difference immaterial to the offence definition, if it is, then transferred malice works i. Better view because this is in line with the normal rule in the absence of transferred malice
Actus Reus -
1. Basic requirement (S.1(1)
a. Destroying or damaging property belonging to another without lawful excuse
2. Destroying or damaging a. Destruction i. Following D's acts the object no longer exists b. Damage i. Meaning either -
1. Reduction in value of the item (Foster), e.g.
denting the door of a car, or
2. Reduction in usefulness of the item (Knott),
e.g. removing a sandbag from a wall of sandbags ii. Threshold of damage
1. N - In A v R spitting on a police officer's raincoat was held not to amount to damage;
simply wiping would return it to former state
2. Y - other cases take a broader view -
trampling grass on a field was regarded as damage in Gayford and easily removable graffiti on a cell wall (Kingerlee)
iii. Adding to property may be damage 1. N - In Lloyd and Drake it was held that putting a wheel clamp on a car did not constitute criminal damage because the integrity of the car was unaffected - however, arguable that this reduces the car's usefulness
2. Y - Painting on a pavement (Hardman), or dumping rubbish on someone's land, is considered damage (Henderson)
iv. How significant is the opinion of the owner of property in deciding whether there was damage?
v. Modification of contents of a computer not regarded as damage unless it impairs its physical condition
3. Property (S.10 CDA)
a. Property of a tangible nature, real or personal, including money i. Including wild creatures tamed or ordinarily kept in captivity…
ii. Not including plants/fruits growing wild
4. Belonging to another (S.10 CDA)
a. Any person having custody/control, or any proprietary right or interest, or having a charge b. Where property is subject to a trust, the persons to whom it belongs shall be so treated as including any person having a right to enforce the trust.
1. Destroying or damaging any property
Mens rea -
1. Intention or recklessness as to all 3 elements of the AR
(Smith) - destroying or damaging + property + belonging to another a. Direct or indirect intent will suffice b. Recklessness is Cunningham recklessness
1. Intention or recklessness as to destroying or damaging any property; &
2. Intention or recklessness by the destruction or damage to endanger the life of another
Specific defences (S.5) -
1. A person has a lawful excuse —
a. if at the time of the act D believed that the person or persons whom he believed to be entitled to consent to destruction or damage to the property (1) had so consented, or (2) would have so consented to it if he/they had known of the destruction or damage and its circumstances; or b. if he did the act in order to protect property belonging to himself or another or a right or interest in property which was or which he believed to be vested in himself or another, and at the time of the act or acts alleged to constitute the offence he believed [subjective] —
i. that the property, right or interest was in immediate need of protection; and ii. that the means of protection adopted or proposed to be adopted were or would be reasonable having regard to all the circumstances
2. Case law a. Denton i. S.5 defence available
1. D, employed by T, set fire to business premises.
He gave evidence that he had been asked to start the fire by T, who was, as D believed,
entitled to consent to the damage and intended to make a fraudulent insurance claim b. Jaggard v Dickinson i. **The defence to the charge under s.5 was one of honest belief; that provided that belief existed, its
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