D was selling a product to P which he wasn’t able to make on time, but P agreed to accept delivery at a later date. It was held that this was a mutually agreed variation and that it was binding because sufficient consideration had been given.
Coleman J (in obiter): If no extra consideration had moved from the seller to the buyer, when making the new agreement, he would not have considered the promise to release the cargo at a later date sufficient consideration since it was what the seller was bound to do anyway, and that he would follow Stilk as opposed to Roffey. He said that Glidewell LJ’s reasoning of “factual benefit” (that the promise must confer some benefit in fact, even when it is no more than he was legally obliged to perform anyway) is a non-sequitur (since I hsouldnt have to pay you more for the same). He also says that economic or other duress will prevent reliance on the factual benefit. But on the other hand it is fact that people will work harder on the same task when being paid more, while the employer or contractor may consider extra money paid to get the job done a lesser cost than that of litigation.