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GDL Law Notes GDL Constitutional and Administrative Law Notes

Separation Of Powers Notes

Updated Separation Of Powers Notes

GDL Constitutional and Administrative Law Notes

GDL Constitutional and Administrative Law

Approximately 509 pages

A collection of the best GDL notes the director of Oxbridge Notes (an Oxford law graduate) could find after combing through dozens of applications from mostly first class students and carefully evaluating each on accuracy, formatting, logical structure, spelling/grammar, conciseness and "wow-factor".
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Introduction

- Crux: not much formal SOP in UK, but how much practical adherence to theory?

- Prima facie: lack of formal SOP in UK constitution – esp. between executive + legislature.

  • no formal SOP: uncodified constitution, due to historical development (cf. France, USA); overlaps (e.g. Queen: head of all 3 branches).

  • [Ld Hailsham]: ‘elective dictatorship’ – legislature effectively controlled by executive.

  • [Barendt]: ‘no effective SOP between legislature + executive in the system of checks + balances.’.

  • [De Smith & Brazier]: ‘no writer of repute would claim that SOP is a central feature of the modern British Constitution’ (BUT: formalistic view).

  • [Prof Hood Phillips]: ‘constitutional myth’.

    - BUT: in practice, some adherence – esp. effective separation of judiciary from other 2 branches.

  • practical SOP:

    • 1. statutes + conventions.

    • 2. judicial independence.

  • strengthened by recent developments:

    • 1. growth of judicial review (esp. after GCHQ).

    • 2. evolution of substantive rule of law.

    • 3. HRA 1998.

    • 4. A & Others (2004)

    • 5. Jackson (2005)

    • 6. CRA 2005

  • in practice: always some adherence to theory + now growing.

    • [Barendt]: ‘there is, however, effective separation of judicial power from the other branches’.

    • [Munro]: ‘although not absolute, [SOP] ought not to be lightly dismissed’.

    • [Ld Steyn, Anderson]: ‘our constitution has never embraced a rigid SOP. The relationship between the legislature and the executive is close [but] the SOP between the judiciary and the legislative and executive branches of government is a strong principle of our system of government’.

    • [Ld Diplock, Duport Steel v Sirs]: ‘UK constitution, though unwritten, is firmly based on the SOP’.

    • [Ld Irvine]: SOP is ‘an ideal which must be pursued in a manner appropriate to contemporary circumstances … a flexible and dynamic approach’.

      Theory

      - Theory of SOP: separation of legislature, executive + judiciary prevents accumulation of power.

  • background: Aristotle – need for 3 functions of govt.; Locke: developed idea.

  • Montesquieu (De L’Esprit de Lois: analysing English 18C English constitution presenting idealised picture):

    • 1. 3 functions of government: legislative (make law); executive (apply law); judicial (enforce law).

    • 2. 3 organs: legislature; executive; judiciary.

    • 3. 3 functions should be kept separate: no branch should exercise power of another; personnel separate.

      • rationale: prevent concentration of power, protect rights + freedoms ([Ld Acton]: ‘absolute power corrupts absolutely’).

    • but: absolute separation impossible some overlap + checks/balances needed.

  • - [Munro]: 3 ideas –

    • 1. no body should form more than 1 part of the 3 organs.

    • 2. 1 organ should not exercise functions of other 2 organs.

    • 1 organ should not interfere with/control functions of other 2 organs.

    - Application:

    • France: Art 16 Declaration of the Rights of Man, 1789: ‘any country in which the safeguarding of rights is not assured, and SOP is not observed, has no constitution’.

    • US constitution: rigid separation – Art 1: legislative power Congress; Art 2: executive power President; Art 3: judicial power Supreme Court + other courts; checks + balances – e.g. President may veto legislation but 1/3 of House must support; e.g. President appoints judges, but Senate must approve.

    UK: weak SOP between executive + legislature.

    - No formal SOP in UK: uncodified constitution, pragmatic not principled development – no upheaval since late 17C (cf. USA, France) overlaps (e.g. Queen: head of all 3 organs).

    - Parliament (usually) controlled by govt. – [Ld Hailsham]: ‘elective dictatorship’ clearly contrary to SOP.

    • structural factors: Parliamentary system

      • convention: executive (PM, ministers) drawn from Parliament + tend to dominate it (+ PM can dissolve Parliament) – [Bagehot]: ‘efficient secret’ of the constitution.

      • FPTS elections (usually return majority) + mass political parties: whip system + culture of political patronage.

        • [Barendt]: ‘the advent of mass political parties has destroyed the semblance of such a system which existed a century ago. Except on rare occasions when there is a significant party split, the government effectively controls the legislature’.

      • govt. defines parliamentary agenda.

      • delegated/subordinate legislation: govt. making law; little scrutiny from govt. (e.g. Orders in Council).

      • weak upper chamber: convention – HoL will not reject bills giving effect to manifesto; anyway can only delay (Parliaments Acts 1911 + 1949).

    • prerogative powers: Parliamentary scrutiny difficult (esp. e.g. foreign affairs).

    - BUT: some SOP – statutes + conventions (cannot judge UK by theoretical standard: pragmatic + gradual constitutional development).

    • 1. Bill of Rights 1688: supremacy of Parliament.

    • 2. House of Commons Disqualification Act 1975:

      • s1: members of civil service, police, army cannot be MPs;

      • s2: limit on no. of MPs who can be ministers (95) prevents complete executive control.

    • 3. parliamentary scrutiny of executive: questions + debates; general + select committees; PCA.

      • Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010: parliamentary scrutiny of int’l treaties.

    • 4. conventions – executive accountable:

      • individual ministerial responsibility: ministers accountable to Parliament for dept. + personally.

      • collective cabinet responsibility: cabinet responsible for govt. actions – can face no confidence vote.

    • 5. some independence: Private Members’ Bills (priority on some days).

    - Overall: significant overlap – but structural.

    • [Bolingbroke]: UK does have constitution: system of rules, laws, institutions.

      • pragmatic evolution: no political upheaval since late 17C.

    • Parliamentary system: overlap inevitable most govts. since 1945 have had majority (but not necessarily: small/no majority in 1974; 1977-79; John Major Eurosceptic rebellion; current coalition more independence).

    Practical SOP: independent judiciary

    - Judges well insulated.

    • security of tenure: Act of Settlement 1700; s11 Senior Courts Act 1981 (CC, HC, CoA);...

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