This is an extract of our Standing Quick document, which we sell as part of our Administrative Law Notes collection written by the top tier of Oxford students.
The following is a more accessble plain text extract of the PDF sample above, taken from our Administrative Law Notes. Due to the challenges of extracting text from PDFs, it will have odd formatting:
Standing Senior Courts Act 1981, section 31(3): no application of judicial review shall be made unless the leave of the High Court has been obtained in accordance with rules of court; and the court shall not grant leave to make such an application unless it considers that the applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates.' The issue is how we define 'sufficient interest' and Miles draws a useful distinction between 'private rights' and 'public wrongs'.
? If defined narrowly, standing operates only to protect individuals where their material interests have been affected (private rights); if defined broadly, standing operates to protect the public interest (public wrongs). o Private rights - individualistic; public wrongs - communitarian.
? Can also distinguish between dispositive (merely settling the immediate issue) or expositive (giving an explanation as to a wider issue). Feldman argues that the approach depends on identifying a 'constitutional ethic' - a theory as to what judicial review should do will define the standing rules. A. Move Towards a Public Wrongs Model Before Fleet Street Casuals, standing ensured that individual rights, but not broader interests, could be asserted before the courts - it operated restrictively, and inconsistently, dependent on the remedy sought.
? Their Lordships made clear that standing would play a minimal role, as a threshold test for preventing 'abuse by busybodies, cranks and other mischief-makers' (Lord Scarman).
? Notable that the minimised role of standing at the leave stage created the possibility for success for cases such as Rees-Mogg, Greenpeace and WDM. o These go beyond what Cane terms 'associational standing' (where an individual represent a group whose interest align with their own), or 'surrogate standing' (where the applicant solely represents others' interests.
? These might just be considered attenuated versions of private rights model. o These are clearly in the 'public interest' - e.g. Rees-Mogg was permitted to claim because of his 'sincere concern for constitutional issues'. The basis of this expansion is Lord Diplock's dictum in Fleet Street Casuals: there would be a 'grave lacuna in our system of public law if a pressure group... if even a single public spirited tax pater, were prevented by out-dated technical rules... from brining the matter to the attention of the court to vindicate the rule of law and get the unlawful conduct stopped'.
? Seen most recently in Walton - Lord Reed stated that the court's function was not simply 'to redress individual grievances', but it also had a 'constitutional function of maintaining the rule of law.' o Particularly where the issue is of notable importance and there is no interested individual to bring the case themselves (WDM). B. Inconsistency There has been a clear liberalisation of standing, but it does not embrace a full 'citizen's interest' model, so we still appear to lack a 'constitutional ethic'. Rose Theatre Trust is often invoked to suggest a more private right based approach.
? Schiemann J demanded that the applicant demonstrate an interest beyond that of the ordinary citizen in order to have standing.
? However, doubted: o As Cane notes, the logic seems flawed.
? The approach is found on the idea that standing is a requirement designed to prevent 'uncertainty and chaos'.
Buy the full version of these notes or essay plans and more in our Administrative Law Notes.