Company law notes fully updated for recent exams in the UK. These notes cover all the major LLB company law cases and so are perfect for anyone doing an LLB in the UK or a great supplement for those doing LLBs abroad, whether that be in Ireland, Canada, Hong Kong or Malaysia (University of London). These notes were formed directly from a reading of the cases and main texts and are vigorous, concise and very well written.
Everything is conveniently split up by topic as you can see by the list o...
The following is a more accessible plain text extract of the PDF sample above, taken from our Company law Notes. Due to the challenges of extracting text from PDFs, it will have odd formatting:
MINORITY RIGHTS AND REMEDIES
Minority shareholder; someone with not enough shares to be sure of being able to secure passing of a shareholder resolution
Danger is that dominant shareholder/bloc of shareholders will seek exercise “private benefits of control”
Potential Solutions
Contracting
Shareholders may contract to ensure protection for vulnerable shareholders.
Documents which may provide legally enforceable rights and obligation include:
Articles of association ( via s.33)
Shareholders’ agreements
This solution more realistic in private companies
much easier to bargain: parties deal face to face
much more incentive to bargain: parties cannot simply sell their shares if they are unhappy, as no one wants to buy shares in company in which majority shareholder is abusing power
Less realistic in public companies
Not possible: high turnover of shareholders, too many shareholders for there to be contract between each of them
Disputes less likely: disputes normally arise due to personal dislike between shareholders; this less likely in Plc where company is run by directors
Shareholder Remedies
Is often case however that shareholders in private companies do not contract
May be unkeen to raise contentious issues at start of company’s existence
Shareholders in Ltds may lack knowledge to know what sort of issues will arise
Concerns about lawyers’ fees
Whereas in public companies, directors’ duties are hardly ever enforced by minority shareholders
Armour et al: found that prospect of directors being sued for breach of directors’ duties was “virtually nil”
Is easy for minority shareholders in public companies to simply sell up and leave
Conclusion
Thus is appropriate to allow litigation by minority shareholders
However at same time, is undesirable to make minority shareholders’ rights too strong
Discourages reliance on contracting
Encourages opportunistic litigation
Put more cases into hands of judges (institutionally incompetent)
Shareholders’ options include:
Action for breach of shareholders’ agreement
Personal action (where member is “proper claimant”)
Derivative Claim
Unfair Prejudice Claim
“Winding Up” Claim
Foss v Harbottle
Foss v Harbottle laid down two key rules:
“Proper claimant” principle
Company is “proper claimant” where directors have allegedly breached duties
Thus not open to shareholders to sue for breach of directors’ duties
“Internal management” principle
Board of directors decides on behalf of company whether company will sue a director or someone else
This reflected by Model Article 3
and not the members
Is a procedural bar on shareholders bringing actions.
Designed to prevent wasteful litigation.
However problem is that directors are rarely willing to sue themselves.
Modern Law
CA 2006 replaced common law principles derived from Foss v Harbottle.
Has NOT abolished proper claimant principle
But has reworked internal management principle
Under modern law:
Where directors have breached a duty towards a shareholder, shareholder may sue under “proper claimant” principle
Where directors have breached duty to their company, Foss v Harbottle rules have been displaced by Companies Act section 260-264
Claims by Shareholder Personally
Where director owes duties to shareholder individually, shareholder may sue director himself.
Here, is no need for derivative litigation
Section 260(1)(a): sections 260-264 only cover rights of action vested in the company.
Hence statutory reforms have not abolished proper claimant principle from Foss
Cinematic Finance v Ryder [2010]
Application
Director owes duties to shareholders e.g. where:
Shareholder has personal rights under articles
e.g. director allots shares solely for purpose of destroying a majority
Here, director infringes members’ contractual rights under articles
Re a Company [1987]
Director assumes a duty towards a shareholder due to conduct in general meetings
director refuses to acknowledge C’s votes in a general meeting
Pender v Lushington [1877]
director undertakes to give shareholder advice in relation to shares
HOWEVER director’s refusal to call a poll at a general when one is requested by member might not give rise to personal right
Macdougall v Gardiner [1875] (internal irregularity)
Restrictions
Shareholders cannot sue where ‘no reflective loss’ principle applies; i.e.:
shareholder and company have claim against directors arising out of same set of facts
part or all of loss for which shareholder seeks to recover merely mimics that of company
Johnson v Gore, Wood & Co [2002] (HL) (existence of principle affirmed)
As basic principle, any claim relating to diminution in value of shares is barred.
Extent of Principle
Reflective loss principle prevents recovery by shareholder even where:
Company chooses not to sue director
Company settles with D on terms with which shareholder does not agree
Director has defence to company’s claim (but not the shareholder’s); etc.
Johnson v Gore [2002]
Principle applies even where shareholder holds 99% of shares
Johnson v Gore [2002]
Exceptions
Principle does not apply even if shareholder and company both have legal claims arising from same set of facts where:
D owes no duty to company
Johnson v Gore [2002]
Shareholder’s loss is distinct to that of company
Heron International Ltd v Lord Grade [1983]
Company is unable to pursue claim against D due to act of D himself
E.g. where director’s breach of duty has resulted in company going into receivership (so that cannot afford to sue)
Giles v Rhind [2002]
D has improperly pressured company into settling its claims against D
Perry v Day [2005]
Derivative Claims
Developed as common law exception to rule in Foss v Harbottle.
Put into statutory from by Companies Act 2006.
Application
Allows shareholder to seek leave from court to bring derivative action against director.
Two hurdles for C:
section 261(2):...
Buy the full version of these notes or essay plans and more in our Company law Notes.
Company law notes fully updated for recent exams in the UK. These notes cover all the major LLB company law cases and so are perfect for anyone doing an LLB in the UK or a great supplement for those doing LLBs abroad, whether that be in Ireland, Canada, Hong Kong or Malaysia (University of London). These notes were formed directly from a reading of the cases and main texts and are vigorous, concise and very well written.
Everything is conveniently split up by topic as you can see by the list o...
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