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Supremacy And Fundamental Rights Notes

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

Introduction...................................................................................................... 3
I - Protection of fundamental rights..........................................................................3
A - General Principles................................................................................................................. 3
B - The European Convention on Human Rights........................................................................3
C - Charter of Fundamental Rights............................................................................................. 4
A - Protections................................................................................................................. 4
B - Limitations................................................................................................................ 4

II - Supremacy............................................................................................................5
A - EU Perspective...................................................................................................................... 5
B - Member States' Perspective.................................................................................................. 5

Summary........................................................................................................... 5
I - General principles and fundamental rights.................................................6
Arts. 6 and 7 TEU, Art. 19 TEU................................................................................................... 6

A - General Principles.................................................................................................6
Wyatt & Dashwood, Ch. 10......................................................................................................... 6
I - The General Principle of Sincere or Loyal Co-Operation..............................................6
II - Subsidiarity.................................................................................................................. 6
III - Proportionality............................................................................................................ 7
IV - Legal certainty and legitimate expectation.................................................................7
V - Non-discrimination....................................................................................................... 7

I - What are general principles? And what are not?............................................................7
Case 120/86 Mulder [1988] ECR 2321 (Legitimate expectation);...............................................7
Cases 117/76 and 16/77 Ruckdeschel [1977] ECR 1753 (equal treatment/non-discrimination); 7
Case 114/76 Bela-Muhle [1977] ECR 1211 - from the first tutorial - on proportionality and non-discrimination);.................................................................................................................... 7
Case C-144/04 Mangold [2005] ECR I-9981 (non-discrimination on grounds of age);................7
Case C-427/06 Bartsch [2008] ECR I-7245; Case C-555/07 Seda Kucukdeveci, [2010] ECR I365 (Grand Chamber)................................................................................................................. 7

II - Limits to general principles........................................................................................... 7
Case C-13/05 Sonia Chacon Navas [2006] ECR I-6467 (non-discrimination on grounds of sickness not a general principle)................................................................................................. 8
Case C-101/08 Audiolux [2009] ECR I-9823:...............................................................................8

B - Fundamental Rights..............................................................................................8
Schutze Ch. 12............................................................................................................................ 8
Chapter 11 - Fundamental Rights............................................................................................ 8
I - Caselaw of the CJEU.................................................................................................. 8
II - Response of the political institutions...................................................................8
III - Scope of application of fundamental rights........................................................9
Chapter 12 - The Charter of Fundamental Rights.................................................................10
Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125;...........................................10
Case C-159/90 SPUC v. Grogan [1991] ECR I-4685..................................................................10
See Case C-60/00 Mary Carpenter [2002] ECR I-6279.............................................................11
Case C-540/03 Parliament v Council [2006] ECR I-5769..........................................................11
Case C-432/05 Unibet v. Justitiekanslern [2007] ECR I-2271...................................................11
Joined Cases C-402/05P & C-415/05P Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council [2008] ECR I-6351;....11
Case T-85/09 Kadi v. Commission [2010] ECR II-5177.............................................................11
Case C-584/10P, judgment of 18 July 2013...............................................................................11
Fransson (Case C-617/10 26 February 2013)............................................................................11
Case C-236/09 Association belge des Consommateurs Test-Achats et al v. Council, [2011] ECR
I-773.......................................................................................................................................... 11
Joined Cases C-293/12 and C-594/12 Digital Rights Ireland et al, judgment of 8 April 2014. . .12
EU LAW: SOURCES AND SUPREMACY

Page 1 Case C-544/10 Deutsches Weintor eG v. Land Rheinland-Pfalz, judgment of 6 September 2012.
.................................................................................................................................................. 12
Case C-134/15 Lidl GmbH (30 June 2016)................................................................................12
C-203/15 and C-698/15 Tele2 Sverige, & Watson, Brice, Lewis judgment of the Grand
Chamber (21 December 2016).................................................................................................. 12
J. Snell, 'Fundamental Rights Review of National Measures' (2015) 21 Eur Public Law 285...12
Opinion 2/94 [1996] ECR I-1759............................................................................................... 12
Matthews v. UK [1999] 28 EHRR 361.......................................................................................12
Opinion 2/13 Accession to the ECHR (judgment of 18 December 2014)..................................12

II - Supremacy of EU law................................................................................12
A - in the European Court.........................................................................................14
I - The genesis of EU legal authority......................................................................................... 14
II - Claims of EU legal authority............................................................................................... 15
III - Foundations of EU Authority..............................................................................................15

Cases.................................................................................................................................. 17
Case 26/62 Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 1............................................................................17
Case 6/64 Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585;................................................................................17
Case 11/70 Internationale Handelsgesellschaft........................................................................18
Case 106/77 Simmenthal [1978] ECR 629................................................................................18
Cases C-10-22/97 IN.CO.GE [1998] ECR I-6307;......................................................................19
Joined Cases C-188/10 & C-189/10 Melki, Abdeli [2010] ECR I-5667;......................................19
Case C-399/11 Stefano Melloni, judgment of 26 February 2013;.............................................19
Case C-614/14 Ognyanov (5 July 2016), ECLI:EU:C:2016:514..................................................21
Art. 4 (3) TEU............................................................................................................................ 21

B - In the national courts.........................................................................................21
I - Germany........................................................................................................................ 22
Brunner [1994] 1 CMLR 57....................................................................................................... 22
'Bananas'................................................................................................................................... 23
U. Elbers and N. Urban (2001) 7 European Public Law 21.......................................................24
Treaty of Lisbon 2 BvE 2/08, 30 june 2009...............................................................................25
On ultra vires review........................................................................................................... 25
On identity review............................................................................................................... 26
Honeywell [2011] 1 CMLR 1067............................................................................................... 26
M. Payandeh, 'Constitutional Review of EU Law after Honeywell' (2011) 48 CMLRev 9........27 2 BvR 2728/13 OMT case ('outright monetary transactions')...................................................27
Case C-62/14 Gauweiler, Judgment of 16 June 2015.................................................................28
Germany's Response................................................................................................................. 29
Payandeh, 2017 Euro Const Law Review 400...........................................................................29

II - Other Member States.................................................................................................. 30
A - Denmark.................................................................................................................................. 30
K. Hoegh, 'The Danish Maastricht Judgment' (1999) 24 ELRev 80..........................................30
Klinge, "Dialogue or disobedience between the CJEU and the Danish Constitutional Court?" 30
Rask Madsen et al, 'Competing Supremacies and Clashing Institutional Rationalities', (2017)
23 ELJ 140................................................................................................................................. 31
B - France..................................................................................................................................... 32
C. Richards, 'The supremacy of Community law before the French Constitutional Court' (2006)
31 ELRev 499............................................................................................................................ 32
C - Post-communist Countries...................................................................................................... 33
A Albi, 'From the Banana saga to a Sugar Saga and Beyond' (2010) 47 CMLRev 791.............33
D - UK........................................................................................................................................... 33 ex parte Factortame [1991]....................................................................................................... 33
HS2 [2014] UKSC 3................................................................................................................... 34
Pham v. SS for the Home Department [2015] UKSC 19...........................................................34

III - Legal pluralism........................................................................................................... 34
Wilkinson, "Constitutional Pluralism: Chronicle of a Death Foretold?" ARENA Working Paper 7/2017....................................................................................................................................... 35
EU LAW: SOURCES AND SUPREMACY

Page 2 Maduro, "Europe and the Constitution: What if this is as Good as it Gets?"............................36
N. Walker, 'Constitutional Pluralism Revisited' (2016) 22 ELJ 333..........................................37
J B Cruz, Another Look at Constitutional Pluralism (2016) 22 ELJ 356....................................38

Questions........................................................................................................ 39

EU LAW: SOURCES AND SUPREMACY

Page 3 INTRODUCTION
I - PROTECTION OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
General principles are the origins of EU discourse on fundamental rights. Today, the starting point is
Art 6 TEU:-

Shows the tension between an enabling provision and a need to limit the exercise of powers
("shall not extend in any way the competences", "shall not affect the Union's competences"...) -
it is listing things that the EU can do but at the same time being careful to say it doesn't extend the EU's competences. It is a political commitment to limitation but conferral of broad powers.
Identifies three sources of human rights protection:
o Art 6(1) Charter

Art 6(2) ECHR - in a sense, this has always been an indirect source of rights protection in the EU, but what would change with accession is that individuals would be able to bring a claim in front of the Strasbourg Court against one of the European Institutions:
the CJEU will no longer be in charge

Art 6(3) General principles
Therefore, we must see how these three sources interact with each other: Schutze

However, there are other provisions in relation to fundamental rights protections:Art 2 TEU: the EU is committed to the protection of human rights
Art 7 TEU (IMPORTANT): an enforcement mechanism for Art 2 TEU against Member States.
But Article 7 is very limited to political dealings - individuals can't really invoke it. Thus, the key limitation is that it's limited to state and international level enforcement ([?] the rest of human rights protection in the EU, which gives individuals actionable rights)

A - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
Early on, deep insertion of EU law into the legal orders of Member States. Supremacy means that any national measure will be disapplied if it comes into conflict with any EU measure. It is a very powerful mechanism - the smallest, most technical EU mechanism will take precedence over national constitutional principles:
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft (1970) at [3]: without the Community itself being called in question, the validity of a Community measure cannot be affected by allegations that it runs counter to either fundamental rights as formulated by the constitution of that State or the principles of a national constitutional structure.
But such a powerful assertion of supremacy cannot stand unless it is accompanied by some allowance:
[4]: analogous guarantees are inherent in Community law - respect for fundamental rights forms an integral part of the general principles of law protected by the CJEU, which are inspired by the constitutional traditions of Member States.

B - THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS
The CJEU has always regarded it as an important source of protection, and the ECtHR has often engaged in a two-way dialogue with the CJEU:EU perspective: Roquette Freres (2004) at [29]: regard must be had to the caselaw of the
ECtHR
ECHR perspective:
o Matthews v UK (1999): supremacy of EU law is no defence for MSs to violate human rights protections, however

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Bosphorus (2005): presumption that EU law is consistent with human rights protections
(i.e. don't come to Strasburg each time you lose a case at the ECJ)

EU's accession to the ECHR?Opinion 2/94: CJEU says it is impossible to accede under Article 352 TFEU
Accession Agreement 2013
Opinion 2/2013 (MUST READ IN FULL, and compare with Opinion of the AdvocateGeneral): CJEU again said that, in principle, the EU could accede, but then it would have to make certain structural changes ? question is then whether the Council of Europe will accept such a modified version of accession that is essentially useless in terms of remedies

One may question the CJEU's motives here, but it can also be seen as an example of the CJEU policing the boundaries of EU competence (cf Art 6(2) - will not affect Union competence).

C - CHARTER OF FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
A - PROTECTIONS

Started as a very subsidiary thingUnibet v Justitiekanslern (2017): "the principle of effective judicial protection ... Fundamental
Freedoms ... and"

The Charter includes a mixture of traditional rights protection and broader socio-economic rights: it has right to life and prohibition of torture (Arts 2, 4), but it also has rights to free market activation etc.One particularly problematic right is Art 16 (right to conduct a business), so that economic operators will argue that any form of market regulation is a violation of their fundamental rights.

Exam tip: remember Article 16 for problem questions - whenever advising a trader about any kind of regulation. But then conclude that the EU's response is proportionate.
There are also horizontal clauses in Chapter 7:Art 51: Charter is addressed to the Union Institutions (always) and MSs (only when implementing EU law)
Art 52: READ AMS CASE (Case C-176/12 Association de mediation sociale, judgment of 15 January 2014) AND THINK ABOUT ARTICLE 52 on the differences between rights and principles and how the CJEU is different from the Advocate-General.

Exam tip: Digital Rights Ireland is essentially an example of an EU problem question, where a fundamental rights violation was found to be disproportionate because of the vast blanket power.
There are other cases where the CJEU has held rights interferences to be proportionate, with very detailed scrutiny of the Charter. These cases show how the Court operates in this context (rather than setting down any constitutional principles): ex. Prigge (2011).
B - LIMITATIONS

General principles - Mangold: shows how powerful fundamental rights protections can be, and how it can operate even where it is a horizontal situation and concerns a directive... Which means that
MSs might be concerned about this:
Charter - This concern is found in Art 52(1) of the Charter. However, this fetter isn't really as powerful as it seems:

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Fransson (2013): the CJEU interprets extremely widely the scope of Article 52(1), reflecting again this tension between the need to limit very broad powers for the EU, and these limitations do not work as Fransson reflects

The scope of fundamental rights protections is a long-standing problem in EU law:SPUC v Grogan (1991): what is being litigated here is the ban on the giving of information.
Here, the AG and the CJEU both say that the Irish Constitution can stand but do so via different routes - the AG says that it is proportionate; the CJEU says that it is outside the scope of EU
law.

But the CJEU is not always so reticent about the scope of EU law:Mary Carpenter (2002): shows that once you're in the scope of EU law you get very strong fundamental rights protection, but the dubious part is regarding the scope of EU law itself - it is a fundamentalist sexist approach on the one hand to say that he can't look after his children,
but legally the problem is that the threshold of what counts as an obstacle to free movement rights is that it is a nuisance to travel overseas a few times a year. If this is the threshold to being within the scope of EU law, then the scope of EU law is very wide indeed.

Thus, this is the very opposite extreme to SPUC v Grogan. Jeremias thinks that technically Mary
Carpenter is not wrong in that there is a cross-border element, but just that on the facts this crossborder element is very weak.

II - SUPREMACY
A - EU PERSPECTIVE
Key case: Costa v ENEL - CJEU says that it is the MSs themselves who transferred and gave up that sovereignty, and without supremacy, there is basically no point in having EU law.
The CJEU developed this principle:any EU norm has to be supreme over any domestic norm (Internationale Handelsgesellschaft)
every court is an EU law court, and even first instance judges must declare incompatibility
(Simmenthal)
it doesn't mean that the incompatible national law is struck down, just that it is disapplied
(Simmenthal)
this creates a lot of problems regarding domestic legal structures (IN.CO.GE)
and in the context of fundamental rights protections (Stefano Melloni)

Illustrates that sometimes, supremacy means that you will have better fundamental rights protections
(Fransson), and at other times it provides lower levels of fundamental rights protection (Stefano
Melloni) - does this mean that fundamental rights protection is only secondary to supremacy and general objectives of EU law?

B - MEMBER STATES' PERSPECTIVE
In the UK: Factortame and HS2
In Germany: Solange I, Solange II - it's not about outright defiance of supremacy, but about asserting that the reason you're doing it is not because of EU law but because of national law.Lisbon (2009): this is very different from previous JP from the German national courts.

Essay tip: the very important cases are Lisbon and Gauweiler, not Solange I and Solange II. Don't spend ages analysing the latter! The flavour has changed since the Solange cases - right now, we can no longer say that the EU doesn't comply with human rights (the reasoning underpinning the Solange cases) - so German courts are pulling out other weapons, saying that it's not merely fundamental
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Page 6 rights that are at stake but there are other things too (based on the idea of national identity, which is very intrusive). But perhaps this is legitimate goal-post changing because of the changing nature of the EU.

I - GENERAL PRINCIPLES AND FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS
A - GENERAL PRINCIPLES
WYATT & DASHWOOD, CH. 10
General principles = written or unwritten principles that supplement the Treaties and guide their interpretation, operating to (1) define and limit the scope of EU competence and (2) place obligations on MSs in implementing EU legislation and acting within the scope of EU obligations.
I - THE GENERAL PRINCIPLE OF SINCERE OR LOYAL CO-OPERATION

Art 5 EEC, Art 10 EC, Art 4(3) TEU = Member States must take all appropriate measures (general or particular) to ensure fulfilment of the obligations arising out of the Treaty or resulting from action taken by the Institutions of the Union, and assist each other in carrying out tasks which flow from the
Treaties.
Thus, the principle requires:-

The Commission (and all institutions) to assist national judicial bodies dealing with infringement of EU rules (disclosing documents to national courts, respond as quickly as possible to their requests, accept jurisdiction in preliminary references outside the scope of EU
law where it feels that the answer is useful to national courts)
It is binding on national courts as well as all national organs (Von Colson)
It has been directly or indirectly responsible for direct effect, supremacy, duty of consistent interpretation, principles of equivalence and effectiveness, Francovich liability
II - SUBSIDIARITY

It is a general principle because it lays down conditions for the exercise of EU competence, and noncompliance can (at least in theory) lead to annulment of Union acts.-

It is not a general principle derived from the common constitutional traditions of Member
States but from Art 5 TEU, and unlike general principles proper which bind MSs and Union institutions, subsidiarity by its nature binds only the Union.
It should in principle aid in interpreting EU legislation (the CJEU should prefer an interpretation that is consistent with subsidiarity over one that is not) - this was confirmed in
AvestaPolarit Chrome Oy
III - PROPORTIONALITY

Proportionality (Art 5 TEU) serves both to (1) limit actions of the Institutions and (2) limit Member
State action.Limit to EU action: it has found expression in specific Treaty provisions (all measures required to attain objectives of the Treaty (Art 40(2) TFEU); harmonization necessary to ensure the establishment of the common market (Art 113 TFEU)) but the CJEU found it to be a general principle of Union lawLimit to Member State action: must comply when implementing Union law or acting within the field of Union law.

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