Theory Of Moral Sentiments Summary Notes

The Theory of Moral Sentiments (1759)

Part I: of the Propriety of Action

Sympathy

• Sympathy:"how selfish soever man may be supposed, there are evidently some principles in his nature, which interest him in the fortune of others, and render their happiness necessary to him" It is derived from the "imagination" of what sensations of the person principally involvedare (9)

• "Fellow-feelings" (10)

• sympathy not just with pain and sorrow. You can sympathise with any emotions (10) but we do not sympathise with all emotions, some emotions "disgust and provoke" us, like the behaviours of an angry man (11)

• therefore, sympathy arises not from the sight of that emotion, but from the imagination of what excites that emotion (12)

• Our sympathy w/ sorrow is much stronger than sympathy with joy, because pain is more pungent sensation than pleasure.

Pleasure of Mutual Sympathy

• nothing is more pleasurable than observing that someone else is sympathising with you, and usually shocked by the absence of that (13)

• pleasure is magnified by sharing with someone else. Misfortune lessened when shared too (14-15)

Howwe judge of the propriety or impropriety of the affections of other man

• when the original passions of the person principally concerned are in concord with the sympathetic emotions of the spectator, the emotions appear to be "just and proper" (16)

• the passion of others must be suitable to the objects. We could approve or disapprove of their passions, as well as sympathise or not sympathise w/ them.

• the causes of one's affection constitutepropriety and impropriety, and the effects constitute merit or demerit.

• agreeing w/ or approving of someone's sentiment or judgment is seeing it as something right, agreeable to truth, and not as useful. This is what taste is.

Virtues

• virtues are more than propriety. Whereas virtues should be admired andcelebrated, propriety should be approved of.Virtue is 'something uncommonly great and beautiful'. The great virtues are sensibility and self-command. (25)

Different types of passion

• passion w/ origin from the body e.g. hunger and pain

• passion from imagination (imagination from sympathy)

• unsocial passions: hatred and anger

• social passions: generosity, humanity, kindness, compassion, friendship and esteem.

• selfish passions: middle place between social and unsocial passion. Grief and joy.

Ranks

• Our ambition:we are naturally inclined to pursue riches and avoid poverty. The 'great purpose of human life' is to better our condition. Why? 'It is the vanity, not the ease, or the pleasure, which interests us'. We long to be observed, to be taken notice of with sympathy.

• The poor man is ashamed of his poverty. He feels like he is not being taken notice of, that no one shares any fellow-feeling w/ his sufferings.

• our obsequiousness to our superiors arises from our admiration of their situation. It seems to no other virtue appears to have any merit compared to this e.g. knowledge, industry, beneficence. However, if a poor man wishes to distinguish himself, it must be by these more important virtues.

  • Here he mentions the 'stoical philosophy': nature disposes us to pursue the strength of body and the mind, health, perfections, and anything that can help us secure these qualities e.g. riches and power. So these are means to an end.

• However, although we are disposed to admire the rich and thepowerful, and to despise those of mean conditions in order to establish ranks and order of society, it is 'the great and most universal cause of the corruption of our moral sentiments' e.g. the vices and the follies of the rich are much less despised.

• To win admiration there are two routes: to attain virtues and wisdom and to attain riches and power. Many more people admire the latter than the former.

• our inclination to imitate the rich sets what is called fashion. Their dresses, their speech and even their vices and follies become fashionable.

  • does this tie into WN?We aspire to be rich, and it is natural, soSmith wants to find out how we can be rich but still disapproves of the morality of it?

Part II Of Merit and Demerit

Section II Of Justice and Beneficence

• Beneficence is always free, and the mere want of beneficence deserves no punishment. A want of gratitude in someone will merit the impartial spectator's rejection of all fellow-feelings w/ the person, but it does not mean he could be punished.

• Justice however is not free. Violation of justice can do injury to others, and would expose a person to resentment. This is rooted in our natural feeling of resentment, which Smith thinks is a mechanism to protect innocence and deter evil. Observation of justice is done for propriety, for the approbation of all mankind.

  • Justice is a negative virtue—'we may often fulfil all the rules of justice by sitting still and doing nothing' (82)

• Impartial spectator

  • although it is a naturally preference that we place our happiness above everyone else's and we are 'more deeply interested in whatever immediately concerns himself'. in judging ourselves, we view ourselves in the light of how we appear to others, which can humble our self-love.

  • by sympathising w/ the hatred of other men towards him, violators of justice would regret the unhappy effects of his own conduct, and...

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