R (Chester) v Secretary of State for Justice [2013] UKSC 63

KEY POINTS

• EU elections allow citizens to elect Members of the European Parliament (MEPs) every five years, reflecting democratic values and enabling EU citizens to influence EU legislative decisions.

• EU citizens have the right to vote in both EU and municipal elections in their member state of residence, promoting democratic participation at local and EU levels.

• A statutory ban prevents convicted prisoners, including those serving life sentences, from voting, reflecting societal views on the disenfranchisement of serious offenders.

• The compatibility of the voting ban with treaty rights is assessed by evaluating if it aligns with EU and human rights laws, considering fundamental democratic principles.

• The right to free and fair elections is a fundamental human right. Restrictions on voting, such as for prisoners, must be consistent with international human rights standards.

FACTS

• A life-sentenced prisoner in England applied to vote but was denied due to the statutory ban in the Representation of the People Act 1983 and the European Parliamentary Elections Act 2002.

  • The Ministry of Justice confirmed the ban, noting it was inconsistent with the European Court of Human Rights view but not yet amended.

  • The prisoner sought judicial review, arguing the ban was incompatible with human rights and requested to vote.

• The court dismissed the claim, and the Court of Appeal agreed, stating it was not the court’s role to enforce changes or interpret EU law separately.

  • A draft Bill was later proposed to either allow voting based on sentence length or continue the ban.

• In another case, a life-sentenced prisoner in Scotland applied to be registered to vote in local and Scottish Parliament elections but was refused under the same statutory ban.

  • He challenged this, claiming it violated EU voting rights under Article 20(2)(b) FEU and Article 40 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU.

  • The Lord Ordinary and the Inner House both rejected his claim, ruling EU law does not guarantee voting rights in Scottish Parliament elections and only applies to EU citizens residing outside their home state.

• The appeals focused on whether the blanket ban was compatible with human rights standards and the application of the European Court of Human Rights decisions.

JUDGEMENT

• The court affirmed the decisions of the Court of Appeal and the Inner House of the Court of Session.

• The appeals were dismissed for the following reasons:

European Court of Human Rights Decisions

• The Supreme Court must "take into account" Grand Chamber decisions but would only refuse to follow them in cases involving fundamental domestic principles or severe oversight.

• The Grand Chamber has ruled that the blanket ban on prisoner voting is incompatible with Article 3 of the First Protocol, leaving no room for further UK-ECHR dialogue on this issue.

• Since Parliament is considering amendments and a declaration of incompatibility has already been made, the court found it inappropriate to issue another declaration.

European Union Law

• Article 20(2)(b) FEU and Article 40 of the Charter do not apply to Scottish parliamentary elections as they are not "municipal" elections.

• EU law does not grant an individual voting right for these elections; eligibility is a national matter.

• EU provisions on voting rights apply only to citizens residing outside their home state.

COMMENTARY

• The case addresses the contentious issue of prisoners' voting rights in the UK.

  • This legal battle pits domestic parliamentary decisions against the mandates of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).

  • The case illustrates the complex interplay between national sovereignty and international human rights obligations.

• The "margin of appreciation" is a doctrine that allows states some leeway in how they implement human rights obligations, reflecting respect for national sovereignty and differing legal traditions.

  • The English court acknowledges this margin but argues that it would be legally and practically unsound to interpret Article 3 differently from the settled views of the ECtHR.

• The court’s reluctance to deviate from Strasbourg’s jurisprudence shows a key principle of international human rights law: consistency in the interpretation and application of rights across member states.

  • This approach ensures that human rights protections are uniformly applied, preventing significant variations in legal standards between countries.

• The dismissal of the appeals reinforces the principle that domestic courts should respect the authoritative interpretations of international tribunals, especially when these interpretations reflect a settled line of jurisprudence.

• The ruling reflects a balance between maintaining national legal traditions and adhering to international human rights obligations.

• The case illustrates the delicate balance between national legislative autonomy and international human rights obligations. It reaffirms the importance of adhering to established international human rights standards while passing laws shaped by both domestic and international law.