SUBSTANCE AND PROCEDURE
OPENING
Generally, substance governed by lex causae, procedure governed by lex fori
Dicey, Morris and Collins – procedure governed by Lex fori means English domestic law
Pfeiffer (High Court of Australia) – issues of substance are those relating to the ‘existence, extent or enforceability of the rights or duties of the parties’
Clarkson & Hill – procedure is rules of law, method of trial
Clarkson & Hill – the dividing line between procedure and substance isn’t always clear
Carruthers – English law, particularly where influenced by European developments, is now adopting a more balanced approach to what constitutes a substantive matter
HOW IT WORKS
Briggs – lex fori governs procedural issues, with the only reservation being that the legislative definition of ‘procedure’ in European Regulations may be rather different, and perhaps narrower, than the counterpart definition in the common law of private international law
HISTORY
Lorenzen – historically English lawyers gave the widest possible definition to procedure
Dicey, Morris and Collins – this is no longer true
COMPETENCY
Briggs - this is a procedural matter, however, it’ll be applied with a degree of flexibility, as demonstrated by:
Bumper Development v MPC (CA) – ruined Hindu temple which enjoyed legal personality under Indian law was recognised as competent to sue
Art 13 Rome 1 relevant?
TRIAL
Currently English law, including interim relief (unless legislations says otherwise) determines
Collins – argues that interim relief being governed by procedure is the main prize when issues of jurisdiction are fought
LIMITS TO INTERLOCUTORY ORDERS
Van Uden – worldwide freezing injunction should probably not be ordered unless English court seised of the substantive proceedings. This case also shows that court has discretion not to grant interlocutory reflief, even though Regulation might authorize it to
Allianz – English court can’t grant an anti-suit injunction, even on an
interlocutory basis and even though it might be thought of as a procedural order, where this would have the effect of interfering with the right and duty of a judge in another MS to apply the Regulation to the proceedings in his court
Owusu – English court can’t grant a stay of proceedings in favour of a court in a non-MS where the order means that it will, in effect, not exercise the jurisdiction which the Regulation confers upon it
EVIDENCE
Clarkson & Hill – traditionally all matters of evidence were procedural
Re Fuld’s Estate – under CL burden of proof was a matter for procedure BUT
Rome 1 and Rome II – both say that evidence and procedure excluded from their scope, but say that burden of proof and presumptions are governed by applicable law
Rome I – Art 1(3) says evi and procedure excluded, Art 18 says burden of proof under applicable law
Rome II – Art 1(3) says evi/procedure excluded, Art 22 says burden of proof under applicable law
Briggs – if English law requires evidence in writing and lex causae doesn’t, Briggs suggests there should be no reason why English evidence rules should apply
Yates v Thomson – admissibility of evidence by lex fori
Wall v Mutuelle (EWCA) [2014]
the issue of which expert evidence the court should order should be determined by the lex fori (English law), but it was said (obiter) that the applicable law included judicial practices, conventions and guidelines, such as the tariffs for permanent aesthetic loss published by the Paris Court of Appeal
so foreign damages tariffs apply in cross-border cases
ENFORCEMENT
Brussels I doesn’t affect rules of procedure of national law, save only that these may not be applied to the extent that they would jeopardize the practical effect of the Regulation
LIMITATION
Used to be procedural under common law until
Foreign Limitation Periods Act 1984 – this provided that where any matter is governed by the law of a foreign country, then that country’s law on limitation shall apply irrespective whether it classifies the rule as substantive or procedural except where it conflicts with public policy
Briggs – says that this doesn’t make limitation substantive, it provides a statutory rule which overrides the common law doctrine of characterization
Dicey, Morris and Collins – that the foreign limitation Periods Act includes both statutory and procedural law! Shows how they can blend (ie. England decides when limitation starts and foreign law decides when it ends)
REMEDIES
Traditionally the remedy is a matter of procedure, so whether specific performance, injunction etc applies
Flack v Holm (1820) – remedy is a matter of procedure for the lex fori BUT
Clarkson & Hill – modern approach is to limit procedure to matters which govern and regulate the mode and conduct of proceedings, so that this might not extend to remedies
Briggs – he suggests that English remedy will only be ordered where it dovetails with rights of lex causae for which they were claimed AS SHOWN BY:
Phrantzes v Argenti (CA) – English CA dismissed a claim brought by a Greek daughter seeking an order that her father constitute a dowry, as no English remedy corresponded to so foreign a right SO
GENERAL RULE:
Lex Fori grants remedies only where:
lex causae gives C some remedy similar in character to that granted in English proceedings AND
the English remedy must ‘harmonise with the right according to its nature and extent as fixed by the foreign law’
Briggs – suggests that Regulation 12 means that the lex causae now determines remedies, with as little contribution as possible from the lex fori
DAMAGES
ROME II – lex causae now governs assessment of damage for non-contractual obligations, except for defamation which thus means assessment by lex fori, which is from CL cases like:
Boys v Chaplin (HL) – the kind of loss for which damages are recoverable (ie. non-pecuniary pain and suffering) are governed by lex causae. But quantum of pain and suffering was procedure, so lex fori. Another way of putting this is that rights = causae, remedies = fori
Harding v Wealands – re-affirmed quantum point from Boys v Chaplin
Clarkson & Hill – remoteness of damages by lex causae
ROME I – seemingly says that assessment is by lex causae, but there is strange untested wording in Art 12(1)(c) about within the powers conferred by procedural law which is uncertain. Seemingly still lex causae though
CURRENCY OF JUDGMENT
Used to be that English procedural rule that courts could only ever give judgment in sterling UNTIL
Miliangos (HL) – decided that English court can give award in foreign currency. This reflected the fact that there was a period of instability with sterling which could cause unfairness to claimants and also endanger England as a center of commercial litigation
Briggs – this case highlights the flexibility of the courts – not as fixed rules about what’s procedural and what’s not as one might think
WHAT DO WE MEAN BY LEX FORI?
Briggs – even if procedure is governed by lex fori, the lex fori may contain rules of European law which alters the shape of MS’s procedural law. Briggs says it’s clear that this is happening:
‘Service Regulation’ – supplements national law otherwise to be found in CPR
‘Taking of Evidence Regulation’ supplements national law and contains a mechanism for obtaining evidence in other Member States for use in national proceedings
These two regulations highlight how EU legislation is bringing closer together rules on MS procedural laws. So even when we say lex fori, it would be a mistake to think we’re applying the law as derived by English bodies
CONTRAST – but then equally, even when lex causae applies, this can be modified by the...