#12626 - Giddens Functionalism - Sociological Theory

Anthony Giddens - Studies in Social and Political Theory

Chapter Two: Functionalism

• Functionalism has its origins in a marriage between social sciences (esp. sociology) and biology (specifically evolutionary theory)

• After being exported to the USA, ‘function’ and ‘structure’ were conjoined to generate structural-functionalism

Merton: functionalism systematized

• Merton sought a codification of the variety of methods of functional analysis, and recognized the following deficiencies/clarifications required:

  • the meaning of the term function

    • social function refers to observable objective consequences, not to subjective dispositions (aims, motives etc)

      • clearly there is a distinction between the two - outcomes and intentions don’t always coincide

  • ideas that have to be rejected:

    • the assumption of functional unity, the implicit harmony of society (conservative)

    • the idea that all social practices have functions

    • the indispensability of social functions has to be questioned - is religion necessary to society, or are the functions that religion fulfils?

  • functionalism isn’t inherently conservative

• Merton made these revisions:

  • functions are the observed consequences of practices/items which allow for the adaptation/adjustment of the system

    • dysfunction refers to phenomena that act against such adaptation and adjustment

  • functional analysis = assessment of a net balance of an aggregate of consequences

    • a practice may be functional in some respects and dysfunctional in others

  • manifest functions = objective consequences that contribute towards adjustment/adaptation that are intended and recognized by participants in the system

    • latent functions = not intended and recognized

  • analysis of the functional requirements of social systems should recognize that there is a variation of functional alternatives

    • possibilities of change are limited by structural constraints deriving from the interdependence of the elements of a social structure

Nagel: a critical emendation

• Nagel recognizes the presence of functional notions in biology but not in other sciences

  • this is because the entities of biology (organisms) are self-regulating with respect to environmental changes

    • functionalism cannot apply to entities which lack self-regulating capabilities

• Why draw Merton’s distinction between manifest and latent functions?

  • if subjective orientations are not a special variable, then the distinction is unnecessary, and if they are a systemic variable, then they are different items rather than different functions

  • if we treat subjective states as functional variables then we can recognize the difference between an intended and recognized outcome and one where the outcome is not known

• What are functional consequences?

  • do they refer to a characteristic of the final system, the totality of effects which are produced and contribute to the adaptation/adjustment of the system?

    • this is unclear, and the continuum makes it difficult to assess Merton’s ‘net balance’ of functional consequences

• We need to clarify Merton’s ‘functional alternatives’ and ‘structural constraints’

  • is a functional alternative another item which fulfils the same function, or an alternative function which meets given system needs?

    • the the structural constraint is the former, then functionalism is more conservative than if it’s the latter

Stinchcombe: functionalism and theory construction

• For Stinchcombe, functional explanation = where the consequences of some behaviour are essential elements of the causes of that behaviour

  • functional explanation relies on three causally related links:

    • structure/structure activity

    • homeostatic variable

      • factor to be regulated by the system

    • tensions disturbing the first two

      • e.g. in the case of blood sugar control by the liver, storage of sugar is the structure activity, blood sugar level is the homeostatic variable, and the variation in digestive demands is the tension between the two

        • this tension allows variation, and hence selective survival tendencies

• Functional analyses are appropriate in circumstances of equifinality - where one outcome can be reached by many different means

  • this is not the case in closed systems e.g. physics where final states can be explained in terms of initial conditions

  • hence social organizations pursue goals in the face of uncertainty and variable environment

    • we can explain organizational behaviour functionally in terms of uncertainty reduction

• Conservative models of functionalism derive from homeostatic variables being seen as morally desirable

  • but this is not necessary to functionalism, which could instead show which structures operate to perpetuate undesirable phenomena

The appeal of functionalism

• What has motivated functionalism, the connection of the social sciences and biology?

  • view of social and natural sciences as logically unified

    • both deal with open systems

  • the belief that it is useful to see social organization as integrated unities of interdependent parts

    • where interdependence = reciprocal effect mechanisms

      • where these mechanisms sustain equilibrium, the homeostatic principles of physiology also apply to social systems

  • the belief that social systems have a hidden teleology that operates through unintended consequences of action

    • this teleology cannot necessarily be inferred from the intentions of actors

    • this always depends ultimately on the assumption of ‘social needs’ which have to be met for society to survive

Functionalism and intentional action

• Functionalism has a limited and deficient explication of purposive human action

  • the problem with suggesting that subjective states (e.g. of wanting) are a special instance of functions is distinguishing between the teleology of intentional action and the hidden teleology of its consequences

    • wanting cannot be a case in which conduct is caused by its consequences because the motivation is not the achieved circumstance, but the desire for its realization

      • we can want something without acting accordingly at all

      • action undertaken with certain intentions can lead to unintended/unanticipated consequences

      • a plausible functionalist analysis in sociology rests on the thesis of unintended consequences

    • Merton’s distinction between manifest and latent functions breaks down because ‘unintended’ and ‘unrecognized’/’unanticipated’ are treated as equivalent

      • there is a difference between an action committed intentionally, and one committed simply in the knowledge (recognition, anticipation) that it will produce an effect

        • in the latter case, we may be reluctant but resigned

        • this obliteration of the distinction effectively treats intentions as irrelevant as causes of action

      • M suggests that manifest function means that the agent knows the consequence that is desired will come about, and also that he knows in what ways that consequence is functional for the system

        • but must this be the case for a manifest function to exist?

      • manifest functions are intended and recognized by participants in the system

        • but who are they? we can imagine cases in which the actions of individuals who don’t know are manipulated by those that do (power imbalance)

The explanatory content of functionalism

• In functionalism, the teleology of the term ‘function’ or falsely applied

  • is functional analysis causal?

    • Durkheim etc view function/cause as coterminous with synchronic/diachronic

    • in biology, maybe not - the function of an organ can be examined without referring to the causes that brought it into being

      • but even in biology, it is difficult to see how ‘the function of the brain is to coordinate the nervous system’ isn’t translated into causal statements about the interplay between brain and nervous system

  • what’s the difference between functional and causal explanation?

    • Stinchcombe - functional exp. is a type of causal exp. involving a homeostatic process

      • homeostatis presupposes system needs (hence there is more than just wants), because regulation must be relative to the survival of some system (otherwise ‘function’ is redundant)

  • but in fact, system need presupposes the existence of wants/interests, and without independent system needs, functionalism fails

    • in biology homeostatic regulation presupposes that an organism has an interest in continuing survival - hence we cannot apply the term function to purely mechanical processes

    • ‘need’ is falsely applied unless it is recognized that system needs presuppose actors’ wants

      • but without independent system needs, the concept of function is superfluous, since the only teleology is that of the actors themselves, together with the recognition of unintended consequences

  • it is often supposed that even in the absence of ‘system needs’, societies which survive for long must have met certain exigencies

    • yet these exigencies, which are essentially ‘functional prerequisites’, are present in functionalism’s definition of society - ‘members must share a body of cognitive orientations’, there must be ‘role differentiation and role assignment’

      • these can’t be treated as the functional explanation of lasting societies, because they are necessary (definitionally) characteristics of society

The concepts of ‘system’ and ‘structure’

• Functionalism (structural functionalism) assimilates the notions of system and structure

  • in structuralism the structure is...