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#19669 - 5.D. The Relationship Between Law And Morality Natural Law - Jurisprudence

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LECTURE(s)

  • Natural law precedes Hart-Dworkin debate = it’s an ancient polemic

  • NL assumes slightly different questions – e.g., why have law at all? Should we obey the law?

  • Practical reason (PR) – reason for action (vs theoretical reason – reason for belief)

    • E.g., meteorologist may give you knowledge about weather, but not how to act

Practical Reason

  • NL pertains to practical reason – reason that guides our actions

  • If Finnis is right, NL is binding on us; we are capable as humans of ascertaining practical reason, and therefore, the value of law

  • NL pertains ethics as much as to law – what does practical reason tell us? (first question)

    • By extension, we get to law, but NL theory doesn’t begin with law

  • Origins of NL are religious – Thomas Aquinas; BUT idea of NL is within our grasp regardless of religion

  • PR is reason for action, BUT that’s no different than understanding the way things are (Aquinas) – we understand how the world works (e.g., motion, gravity, etc.)

    • Just as we make true judgments about how things are, so we make true judgments about what to do

  • Finnis ACK Aquinas, but his ideas stand regardless of religious dogma

    • For Aquinas, PHI and religion are intimately connected

      • Even if something is revealed (religiously), there can be both theological and PHI discussion

  • Good to be done, evil to be avoided – we can apprehend what is in fact good

“New Natural Law Theory”

  • Synderesis – capacity to apprehend what is good; innate capacity

    • We attain this capacity by inclination, reflection, etc. = we flesh it out

  • For Finnis, this goes far beyond a formal notion (e.g., love thy neighbor); he isn’t content that some sort of categorical imperative – PHI reflection also reveals certain basic forms of human flourishing

    • These too can be discovered by reflection (synderesis)

  • These are self-evident and indemonstrable = truth of these goods cannot be shown

  • Basic goods/forms of human flourishing – life, knowledge, religion, work, practical reasonableness (PR) etc.

    • Odd for PHI to make very substantive claim about what is claim (Finnis does this)

  • These goods are self-evident, but they’re also incommensurable + non-hierarchical

    • Cannot be put into a utilitarian calculus – they may conflict

  • Practical reasonableness overarches these goods – PR directs us how to identify/achieve these goods

  • Point is – no one can doubt/dismiss the value of these basic goods = they are self-evident

    • BUT his theory doesn’t depend on a precise list

The Common Good

  • HOWEVER, the common good (CG) is crucial

  • Basic goods = each of us individually has reason to value/act upon; BUT we live with others – we need to live a life where each of us can pursue BG = non-instrumental concern for other persons (Golden Rule)

  • We are capable, via exercise of PR, to identify which types of behavior facilitate BG

  • Laws – support the achievement of BGs; e.g., law that prohibits murder – support basic good of life

  • Law doesn’t always get it right, but in “central case”, laws do facilitate attainment of BG

  • The evils of not having law are obvious = law is a remedy against anarchy and tyranny

    • Law is by its nature morally valuable

      • RAT force of this claim is INDEP of content of law

Law in New Natural Law Theory

  • Practical PHI – how should I act?; POL/legal PHI – how should I act in community with others?

  • Law, like morality, gives us reasons to for action in community with others = subject matter of practical PHI

Natural Law Theory of Positive Law

  • NL is ostensibly superior to LP – it has a theory of PL AS WELL

    • Does everything that LP does, and more – makes LP redundant

    • NL has a better theory of PL than PL – explains something that POS LP

  • NL is a misnomer – it’s a theory of PL (in a certain sense)

  • Law’s source-based character (LP claim) depends on SOC facts = critical in enabling CG

    • We don’t just need to trivially point out that law is source-based

      • It’s critical for a community to have source-based FOR the COMM to advance CG

  • Positive law provides a reason for action and moral obligation to comply

  • PL can be both social and NOR – presupposed by slogan “unjust laws aren’t laws”

    • If we look at idea of LP, it was invented by NL – LP is therefore true, but besides the point

      • All that LP does is focus on first part of exercise = law as a SOC fact, BUT completely neglects the second part – reasons for law as a SOC fact/reasons for complying with it

  • Strong connection between POS law and morality

    • Common error – you have moral requirements, which are then translated to legal requirements

      • Law isn’t simply a copy of what morality requires

    • Two types of connection:

      • Derivation – restating requirements of PR in legal form; move from A to B is simple – in those cases, force of law comes not just from POS law

        • E.g., you don’t murder just coz the law says so

      • Determinatio – more indirect; requirements of PR aren’t fully determinant (i.e., how to act in every situation) = broad principles; law determines what would be indeterminate

        • More than one option may be available; NL provides framework for POS law – role of POS law is to make determinate those requirements of PR that are broad

        • This means that legal authorities have discretion – they select between options that might equally satisfy PR = arbitrary?

  • Once we have POS law, we have a new obligation – simultaneously legal (coz established by authority) AND moral (although it’s arbitrary, based on PR ultimately, coz PR allows for discretion/arbitrariness)

  • There’s a truth in LP, but it’s a limited one

    • There is something like legal validity – we can identify valid law if it came from authorities that are authorized; to that extent, we can identify the law without examining its merits

      • This is trivial, however = it’s insufficient – tells us nothing about what we should do

        • If we’re trying to understand SOC INSTs, it’s better to ask “why have it?”, rather than “what is it?”; by asking why, we get BOTH NOR and SOC aspect

A Presumptive Moral Obligation to Obey the Law?

  • Moral obligation isn’t unconditional – it can be defeated sometimes = must accord with PR

    • BUT NL ACKs the authority of POL INSTs – law depends on facts to an extent

  • Prime example – UNJUST laws

    • How can something that is a SOC fact as law not be a law?

  • Some ways around it (unjust):

    • Still a law, but shouldn’t be obeyed

    • Shouldn’t be applied, but is still law

    • Isn’t law at all – loses quality of law itself

      • An unjust law is no law at all; lex iniusta non est lex

  • Finnis – unjust laws are laws in a secondary sense (made by directives of authority), BUT not in terms of FOCAL meaning of law; e.g., bad ARGs aren’t really ARGs, or medicine that’s so bad that it’s not medicine

    • There can be DEFECTIVE instances of law, in other words

  • Crucial in Finnis’ ARG – POS law still makes presumptive obligation to obey

  • Finnis ARG works, however, only where a SOC is relatively just; not in rotten SOCs (where this presumption might not even arise)

  • NOTE – CG is critical = non-compliance must be balanced contra CG

Methodology: The Point of Law

  • Similar to Dworkin – human INSTs (unlike natural sciences) must be understood for their point; not DESCR

  • Similarly, cognate concepts (e.g., justice) aren’t external to law, but are part of concept of law in focal sense

  • The fundamental question – why have law at all? Gives us answer to why we need to accord to INSTs

  • Reason to have law = CG requires it – not in utilitarian sense, it’s about securing conditions to pursue BGs

  • Whole enterprise of POS juris is redundant – questions of law are always questions of reasons for actions

  • HOWEVER, Hart sees this to an extent, BUT he doesn’t take it to its end

    • For Hart, it’s about survival in community – for Finnis, it transcends it = flourishment

  • Two questions remain, however:

    • Why presume that central case of law is morally just?

      • There are deeply unjust laws – theory should account for all laws, not just PR-abiding

    • If we want to accept that ARG makes moral obligation to obey, at what point does injustice undermine this?

  • Duke – is law just instrumentally valuable to achieve the stability of authority, or is there some more substantive moral ARG for obeying law?

READING(s)

Stanford Encyclopedia

  • NL = law is BOTH a sheer SOC fact of power/practice AND a set of reasons for action

    • Presupposed by “unjust laws are not laws”

  • Main question – how and why can law, and its positing LEGIS/judicial decisions/customs, give subjects solid reason for acting in accordance with it?

  • NL – “source-based character” of law is crucial in its ability to advance good

    • The question whether law in its very nature is problematic has therefore been important since the outset; necessary, but potentially evil

  • Natural in the sense of “REASON”

Finnis, “Natural Law and Natural Rights”, pp. 3 – 19

I – Evaluation and the Description of Law

I.I – The Formation of Concepts for Descriptive Social Science

  • Some human goods can only be secured via INSTs of human law

  • Actions/practices/habits are certainly influenced by “natural” causes investigated by methods of natural sciences, BUT they can only be fully understood by understanding their objective

    • These A/P/H vary greatly from one SOC to another – tough to make general descriptive theory

  • Conceptions of law (jus, lex, nomos, etc.) are varied; even listing these various practices requires a principle of selection of items = juris is more than lexicography

  • Austin, Bentham, show little awareness about selection; similar case with Kelsen

    • Selecting concepts for purpose of...

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