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Bonner V. Tottenham Building Society Notes

BCL Law Notes > Restitution of Unjust Enrichment BCL Notes

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BONNER V. TOTTENHAM BUILDING SOCIETY FACTS On April 3, 1882, the owner of the premises, Moore, demised them to the plaintiffs for a term of ninety-nine years at the rent of 20l. per annum, which the plaintiffs covenanted to pay. On April 5, 1889, the plaintiffs assigned to Price the residue of the term, Price covenanting with the plaintiffs to pay the covenanted rent and indemnify the plaintiffs therefrom. On October 18, 1889, Price demised by way of mortgage the term less one day to the defendants to secure advances made by them to him, and the defendants covenanted with Price that, if they should enter into possession of the premises and receive the rents and profits, they would pay the yearly rent of 20l. per annum reserved by the lease of April 3, 1882. In November, 1891, Price was adjudicated bankrupt. The defendants have entered into possession of the premises under their mortgage, and have received the rents and profits thereof in part satisfaction of their mortgage debt, and they have remained in possession ever since. The defendants have not paid the rent which accrued whilst they were in possession, and Moore, the landlord, has compelled the plaintiffs, his lessees, under the covenant in their lease with him to do so; they have done so, and they now sue the defendants to recover the amount they have thus had to pay to Moore. It is clear that no contract or privity of estate exists between the plaintiffs and the defendants, or between the original lessor, Moore, and the defendants. HOLDING A. L. SMITH LJ The ratio decidendi of Moule v. Garrett (2) is this: If A. is compellable to pay B. damages which C. is also compellable to pay B., then A., having been compelled to pay B., can maintain an action against C. for money so paid, for the circumstances raise an implied request by C. to A. to make such payment in his ease. In other words, A. can call upon C. to indemnify him. To raise this implied request, both A. and C. must, in my judgment, be compellable to pay B.; otherwise, as it seems to me, the payment by A. to B. so far as regards C. is a voluntary payment, which raises no implication of a request by C. to A. to pay. If Cockburn C.J., in his alternative reason in Moule v. Garrett for holding the defendants liable meant this by the expression "by the legal default of another," I agree; but, if it means by a default for which they were not compellable to pay in that case to the original lessor, I do not agree, and none of the other learned judges who decided that case adopted what Cockburn C.J. then said.

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