Contrasting levels of performance between Chinese and Japanese silk-reeling directly linked to differential decline in barriers to learning and transaction costs
Due to divergent political and economic changes
Silk was the leading export in Japan and China between 1850 and 1930 (Yamazawa and Yamamoto 1979)
Japan rapidly overtook Chinese raw silk production during their time of modernization around the turn of the 20th century
China had historically been the leader in silk production
Chinese silk was favoured due to:
Geography
Factor endowments
Global reputation
Market for sericulture was free and integrated
Chinese technology for sericulture moved to Southern Europe
Then Italian and French innovated subtle changes that led to them being world leaders
These innovations came back to East Asia around 1850 allowing China and Japan to once again take the lead
4 new features came from Southern Europe
1) Rigid-axis and cogwheel to more efficiently drive the belt that had been adopted from China
2) Design of an additional twisting mechanism to cross silk threads dry
Allowing for higher quality thread (Zanier 1994)
3) Use of a centralized steam boiler
The most important innovation from Europe
4) Mechanization
The last two innovations were more difficult to implement
Led themselves to factory style production
Silk-reeling was a relatively small scale operation
Dispersed locations
Low capital intensity
European style silk became popular due to evenness and uniformity
Demanded a higher price than traditional hand-reeled silk (up to 40% more) (Fujino et al. 1979)
Even by 1920, machine reeled silk still only accounted for half of silk exports from Shanghai
Why did hand-reeled silk persist in China?
Factory based production results in higher transaction costs
Higher operating costs (marketing, distribution, procurement etc.)
Higher institutional costs (taxation, security, contract enforcement)
Production models lead to the result that hand-reeled and mechanized production may have produced the same profit equilibrium
Machine-reeled:
Higher TFP
Higher price demanded
But more expensive machines
Additional costs
Higher transaction costs
Increases in any of the costs of the machine-reeled silk led to increased profitability of the hand-reeled silk
Allowed hand-reeled silk to maintain it’s appeal
Was difficult to diffuse the technology from Europe to East Asia
High learning effort required
High capital investment costs would be incurred
In contrast, labour was cheap in East Asia and therefore hand-reeled silk maintained it’s popularity in the region
Centralizing production would require social and economic structure to change
The lower Yangzi was a main area for sericulture in China
Jardine, Matheson and Co. introduced the first European sericulture technology
Empirical evidence from records (Brown 1979; Ishii 1998)
Construction of ‘Ewo Silk Filature’ began in 1860 in Shanghai
After 2 years was producing silk to European standards
Size of factory doubled in 1863
Fatal error was in assuming easy procurement of silk cocoons from the hinterland
In Europe, the factories were set up close by to the sericulture regions
Shanghai was 100 miles from the sericulture region
Difficult to setup a stable procurement network due to foreign investment being banned outside of the treaty port
Relied on diplomatic pressure to allow a stable procurement network
Major (who managed the operation in China) believes that locals were bribed to oppose him and his efforts to establish sites outside the treaty ports, and within in the sericulture region (Brown 1979)
His houses were continually burnt down
Those who helped him were put in chains
Closed in 1870 a year after Major died
Had been operating a constant loss from the beginning
Fixed costs of setting up infrastructure for a single factory was too high (Brown 1979)
Over the next decade, innovations in drying and storing fresh cocoons at the site of purchase (Xu, 1990)
Other Western companies now began to setup filatures in China, and Jardine returned this time appointing Chinese merchants to his board of directors (Suzuki, 1992)
First Chinese owned filature opened in 1882 by Huang Zhouqin
Chinese investors preferred Western firms because it gave them extraterritorial protection
Local merchants began to protest of the Western firms
Compromise was made whereby the government closed some of the factories
A tax (likin tax) was imposed on cocoons purchased in rural areas
Introduced licence fees for cocoon stations
Suzuki’s research found a small shift in government policy in the 1880s, whereby they began to allow small private firms
Was not the fundamental change in Self-strengthening Movement, however
Steamships for transportation by locals was still banned
Fundamental change began only after Sino-Japanese War when Japan defeated China in 1896
Eventually lifted all legal constraints on private firms
In 1870s, a new form of merchant firm was established called jinsihang which organized a putting-out system
Silk was purchased from rural peasant households and redistributed to others for re-reeling to improve quality
Jinsihang then packaged it and exported it
Still not a perfect substitute for machine-reeled silk
A Chinese local named Chen Qiyuan travelled extensively around South-East Asia
He discovered the European style filatures in Vietnam (which was under French control)
Wanted to bring this back to China
On returning, he planned to setup a rural filature in Nanhai County
Wanted to keep the machines ‘Chinese’
Didn’t use steam power (foot pedal instead)
Used chopsticks to pick out cocoons
His machines were 1/5 the cost of those in Shanghai (Chen, 1985)
Relied on lineage and village organization (Suzuki 1992)
Used credit advances to help procure a network of cocoon sellers
Made a profit compared to Ewo, and fetched prices 1/3 higher than hand-reeled
Overcame resistance...