This is an extract of our Renault V. Zang document, which we sell as part of our Conflict of Laws BCL Notes collection written by the top tier of Oxford students.
The following is a more accessble plain text extract of the PDF sample above, taken from our Conflict of Laws BCL Notes. Due to the challenges of extracting text from PDFs, it will have odd formatting:
RENAULT V. ZANG FACTS The appellants ("the Renault companies") are foreign companies whose principal place of business is in France. Neither Renault company is registered in Australia as a foreign company and they do not maintain any office or employ any persons in this country. The first appellant sells to Volvo Australia Pty Ltd ("Volvo") in France motor vehicles which Volvo then sells to various dealerships throughout Australia. The respondent ("Mr Zhang") entered Australia in 1986 and undertook postgraduate university studies…. On 5 February 1991, whilst in New Caledonia, Mr Zhang hired a Renault 19 sedan. On the next day, 6 February 1991, Mr Zhang suffered serious injuries when he lost control of the car whilst driving along an unsurfaced roadway; the car somersaulted several times, came to rest on its roof, which was crushed into the passenger compartment. Mr Zhang sought recourse to the Supreme Court of New South Wales to recover damages from the Renault companies for his injuries. In response, there was an application by the Renault companies to stay Mr Zhang's action on the footing that the Supreme Court is an inappropriate forum for the trial of the action. Because neither of the Renault companies had a presence in Australia, Mr Zhang invoked the "long arm" jurisdiction of the Supreme Court as detailed in Pt 10 of the Supreme Court Rules 1970 (NSW) ("the Rules"). Statutory Head of Jurisdiction: Rule 1A of Pt 10 of the Rules provided that, subject to rr 2 and 2A, originating process might be served outside Australia in 24 enumerated cases. In particular, par (e) of r 1A(1) provided for the service of originating process: "Where the proceedings, wholly or partly, are founded on, or are for the recovery of damages in respect of, damage suffered in the State caused by a tortious act or omission wherever occurring." It is common ground that the respondent has suffered damage in New South Wales and will continue to do so, within the meaning of par (e) of r 1A(1). Provisions in the Supreme Court Rules: Part 10, r 6A provides: (1) The Court may make an order of a kind referred to in Part 11 rule 8 (which relates to setting aside etc originating
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